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Abstract  
 
This dissertation investigates FOCAC and TICAD contributions towards development on the African 
continent. The research explains the architecture of the latter conference diplomacy institutions.  
Japan and China are argued to be competing through evidence from the different fields that give 
foreign assistance to. Jospeh Nye’s soft power as theoretical framework will guide the research’s 
understanding of Chinese and Japanese engagements in African development. 
The research found that FOCAC outweighed TICAD in financial contributions however TICAD through 
JICA had more grassroots level contributions. China was seen to be focused on bilateral relations 
aimed at supporting state-led companies in big infrastructure development. Japan is argued to be 
more engaging with external actors while supporting African development and in addition, showed 
more support for the African Union’s policies.  China has ‘win-win’ and Japan has ‘partnership’ both 
in line with African Pan -African ideals.  
Africans are lacking policy and guidelines in dealing with foreign partners and argued to organise 
themselves and respond to Japanese and Chinese interests collectively. Agenda 2063 that mentions 
external partners as a source of funding for development is not enough to use a policy.  African 
development policies are seen to have failed previously due to unfulfilled promises from external 
partners. The research argues that African people should take FOCAC and TICAD as learning spaces 
and take a leadership role in their own development.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Introduction  
 
The Organisation of African Union (OAU) metamorphosed into the African Union (AU) on 
the 9th of July 2002, in Durban, South Africa after the adoption of Constitutive Act of African 
Union1. After thirty-nine years of existence with the mandate to end colonialism and 
midwifing African unity, the organisation needed rejuvenation to spearhead economic 
development. The organisation established the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) institution as tool for economic rejuvenation after the lost decades of 1980s and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1990s2. Mazrui argues that the AU’s 
strategy was of re-engagement of African economies with its former colonial powers –
divorced from the O.A.U’s approach of African political disengagement from its colonial 
powers3.  
The 21st century has seen remarkable shifts in a political and economic landscape that 
previously shaped the global world order post -1945. In East Asia, China’s global ascendance 
against the backdrop of an industrialised Japan has resulted in shifts in African political and 
economic affairs. The ‘Look East Policy’ policy gained currency in developing the world 
including Africa as commodity prices surged at the turn of the century. 
Japan in 1993 pioneered TICAD as a platform for high-level policy dialogue during the 
critical years of international aid fatigue4. Japan’s aim was to refocus international attention 
back to African development. Around the turn of the century, the renowned British magazine, 
The Economist captured Western perceptions of Africa in 2000 through the ‘Hopeless Africa’ 
story.  African contestant difficulties largely due to two decades of unending civil wars, 
corruption and poor governance on the continent prompted this headline5.  
                                                          
1 OAU, Constitutive Act of African Union, Addis Abba, July 2001.   
2 Lensink, Robert (1996). Structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (1st ed.). 
Longman. ISBN 9780582248861. 
3 Mazrui , A. 2013. Changing The Guard The O.A.U To The AU, Fifty Years Of Change .State University at 
Binghamton, New York.,U.S A.   
4  Tembo, Fletcher (2008) "Where next for TICAD: Building lasting partnerships", London: Overseas 
Development Institute 
5 The Economist (2000). Hopeless Africa  , http://wwweconomist.com/node/333429, May 11 
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Japan in 1993 launched the TICAD framework as a vehicle of re-engaging the African States 
against the background of an international community that had turned its back on African 
issues. China, on the other hand, was carefully modifying its engagements with African 
states. The launch of FOCAC as conference diplomacy framework focusing on Africa socio-
economic development in 2000 is viewed as an emulation of Japan’s TICAD framework. 
TICAD and FOCAC present new modalities in which developmental is given. As the 
landscape of aid provision significantly evolves new practices that diverge from the 
traditionally accepted norms continue to emerge. Traditionally, Western governments and 
multilateral organisations have dominated aid provision. It is this dominance that has been 
challenged by the increased voice and leadership of new actors especially the ones from the 
global South. 
These new actors have brought about new systems which question the relevance of overseas 
development model. Japan’s TICAD and China’s FOCAC present the ideal examples that 
illustrate the above-mentioned arguments.  Japan currently provides its assistance within the 
framework of traditional aid givers such as the United States and the European Union. Japan 
joined the OECD and played a significant role in strengthening the best practices models of 
aid provision. On the other hand, China has re-emerged as a significant player that disregards 
the existing norms and values of aid provision. 
The success of “one donor – multiple countries” forums is on the rise on the African 
continent.  Other than China and Japan that hold grant forums with massive media exposure 
India (Africa- India Forum Summit), South Korea (Africa –Korea Forum), Turkey (Africa-
Turkey Cooperation Summit), European states (Joint Africa-EU Strategy) and Arab states 
(Africa-Arab Forum) are the current working partnerships that the AU recognises. 
In the continent’s developmental blueprint, Agenda 2063 it reads that, “Africa’s strategic 
partners have made several financial pledges and technical assistance related support 
packages in trade and investment, industrialization, regional integration, social and 
sustainable development and peace and security to the AU, RECs and member countries that 
are yet to be fully leveraged”6. Tangible results are already noticeable with both TICAD and 
FOCAC meeting their pledges and in most cases delivering beyond the agreed targets.   
                                                          
6 Africa Union Commission , Agenda 2063 : The Africa We Want , http://agenda2063.au.int/.  
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This dissertation will look at how TICAD and FOCAC function, what they have delivered 
and areas where they should focus. Other than comparing the FOCAC and TICAD 
framework, the dissertation will analyse how far the platforms have contributed to African 
development.  
This research focuses only on TICAD and FOCAC as development partners to the African 
Union. The paper through existing literature aims to illustrate how the two forums function 
and how they are built up. Through revisiting previous forums, the paper gives an assessment 
of what both Japan and China have been doing in promoting African development. It is 
important that note that the research employs a comparative study outlook. It does not make 
an outright judgement of who is a better partner for African. The paper will aim at finding 
common positions that FOCAC and TICAD have that can advance the African agenda of a 
peaceful and developed continent. Out of Agenda 2063, six major thematic areas stand out, 
these are (1) Private Sector (2) Human Capital Development (3) Governance, Democracy, 
Peace and Security (4) Agriculture/ Blue Economy and Environment (5) Regional Integration 
and Infrastructure (Transport, Energy and Communication) and (6) Social and Cultural 
Development (Youth and Woman).  
 
Background  
 
China and Japan are East Asia’s powerhouses with massive interests on the African 
continent. The Chinese economic catch-up and subsequent surpassing of Japan have resulted 
in Beijing and Tokyo having competing interests on the continent. These interests are not 
limited to Africa’s vast natural resources but influence in global multilateral institutions like 
the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and World Bank. A good 
example is a Chinese return to the UN that would not have been possible if it wasn’t for the 
support of the African block7. Japan currently is on the forefront of lobbying African states 
for a possible seat on the UN Security Council. One can, therefore, argue that Africa is a 
contested space for both East Asia’s powerhouses. The AU as the chief representative body 
of Africa has increased development, combatting poverty and corruption, and ending of 
Africa's many conflicts high on its agenda.  
                                                          
7 Adekeye Adebajo (2010) ‘The Curse of Berlin, Africa After the Cold War’, University of KwaZulu -Natal Press 
,pp164. 
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Africa’s economic woes of the 1980s commonly known as ‘Africa’s lost economic decade’ 
also witnessed endless conflicts8. Aid fatigue settled in the 1990s as the Cold War ended. The 
USA reduced its funding towards aid while Europe resolved to delegate its economic 
responsibilities to the disciplinary hand of the IMF and World Bank9. Against the backdrop 
of an international community increasingly losing hope in Africa, Japan revamped its Africa 
policy in 1993 through the launching of the TICAD that Japan conducts a dialogue with 
collective African leaders on its engagement on the continent. 
The African continent was largely ignored by international actors as result of poor 
implementation of SAPS, aid fatigue and endless civil wars. The creation of TICAD   by the 
government of Japan, therefore, aimed to promote Africa’s development, peace and security, 
through the strengthening of relations between African states through multilateral cooperation 
and partnership10. Japan, therefore, should be credited for bringing African development, 
peace and security on global platforms after the end of the Cold War. Aid fatigue had resulted 
in global players turning a blind eye to African issues. From its humble beginning in 1993, 
TICAD has proved to be a noteworthy platform for improving Japanese –African relations. 
Today TICAD like setups have mushroomed with all major global economic and political 
leaders having their own arrangements.  TICAD is organised in conjunction with the UN, 
UNDP, the World Bank and the AU.   
The turn of the century was marked by unprecedented economic growth on the African 
continent. Rapid increases in commodity prices and silencing of guns in African conflicted 
regions gave rise to the ‘Africa Rising’ phenomenon. Coincidentally the Chinese economy 
was leading globally resulting in China holding a more elevated position in global political 
and economic affairs. The Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) as an 
institutionalised platform to further Sino-Africa relations provided a platform for the 
transformation of Sino-Africa relations. Since its inception in 2001, the FOCAC framework 
has progressed into a notable multilateral institution that shapes Sino-Africa relations beyond 
states to states level.   
                                                          
8 African Foreign Policies: Power and Process (co-edited with Terrence Lyons). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001, 
http://www.rienner.com/title/African_Foreign_Policies_Power_and_Process 
9 Ward Warmerdam with Arjan de Haan (2011) The Roles of Aid in Politics: Putting China in Perspective. 
International Institute of Social Sciences. 
10 Office of the Special Advisor on Africa ( 2016) , Tokyo International Conference of African Development, 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/partnerships/ticad.shtml.  
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FOCAC and TICAD are exceptional cases because, since their inception, both platforms have 
significantly evolved to suit African demands. The call for fair trade has resulted in both 
platforms prioritising trade on the agenda instead of traditional aid provision. The functioning 
of TICAD and FOCAC are almost similar however Japan and China have different 
methodologies as far a developmental aid is concerned.  Japan is associated with the 
developed world and abides by OECD standards, while on the other hand, China does not 
abide the OECD regulations. 
Both China and Japan have to be credited for their efforts in redirecting international 
attention to African development. Having a comparative study of Japanese and Chinese 
contributions to African development through FOCAC and TICAD is therefore worthwhile in 
building the International Relations discipline understanding of Chinese and Japanese 
relations with Africa. 
 
Research Significance  
 
The 21st century has seen the resurgence of non-Western powers in global affairs particularly 
with the rise of China. Due to East Asian powers (China/Japan) have increased role in 
international affairs, African Affairs have received unprecedented attention in both China and 
Japan respective foreign policies. This research is part and parcel of knowledge accumulation 
in an effort of understanding Chinese and Japanese contributions to African development.  
The Mo Ibrahim Index11 of African Governance currently indicates that there has been 
progressing in governance while the UNECA12 and UNDP13 have evidence of increased rule 
of law, political freedom and steady economic growth. Through the assessments of FOCAC 
and TICAD frameworks, the research aims to serve as a balance sheet on Chinese and 
Japanese contributions to African development. Moreover, African leaders and policy makers 
need to be well informed about Chinese and Japanese interests. This study intends to 
contribute in International Relations academic work produced by Africans in Asia-African 
scholarship. 
                                                          
11 See Mo Ibrahim Foundation,   http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/ (accessed on 10/09/2016) .  
12 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2009), African Governance Report II. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
13 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) (2013), African Governance Report III; Elections and the Management of Diversity in Africa. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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Main Research Question  
How have TICAD and FOCAC contributed to the African Union’s development agenda?  
 
Supporting Research Questions  
 
How do TICAD and FOCAC forums function and who are the important players in the 
respective forums?  
What are the distinguishing Chinese and Japanese developmental characteristics in Africa?    
Have the FOCAC and TICAD frameworks achieved their planned purpose? 
To what extent are FOCAC and TICAD’s developmental assistance in line with the AU 
development agenda?  
What are the similarities and differences between TICAD and FOCAC?  
What is Africa’s contribution to the chairing and planning of FOCAC and TICAD summits? 
What are the fields of interests do the FOCAC and TICAD frameworks predominantly focus 
on?  
 
Methodology  
 
Research methodology is concerned with the process of conducting research. The 
responsibility rests with the research to choose a suitable approach to the study14.  This 
research will be conducted using the comparative study methodology. The research compares 
what the Japan and China are doing on the African continent in relation to the developmental 
goals of the AU. Due to the comparative nature of the study, the research will have 
qualitative analysis. 
                                                          
14 Brynard , P.A & Hanekom, S.X  .2006 . Introduction to research in management fields ( 2nd Ed) Pretoria : Van 
Schaik.  
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Policy outcomes and indicators of development will be utilised to analysing the contributions 
of FOCAC and TICAD to African development agenda. Data will be collected from 
institutions that are involved in development in Africa as well as academic papers written 
about African development. Information from the AU and partner organisations, TICAD and 
FOCAC documents and other global institutions will be paramount to, therefore, the research 
will widely use data from mentioned sources. The following organisation's research work and 
data collection form part of the most used data in this study: NEPAD, The Secretariat of the 
China Follow-up Committee on the Forum, on China- Africa Cooperation, JICA and MoFA 
amongst other developmental institutions.  
Comparing FOCAC and TICAD contributions to the AU’s development agenda will not be 
an easy task. The first task will be identifying what the continent’s development agenda 
entails. TICAD and FOCAC use different methodologies in offering development assistance; 
Japan belongs to the OECD which has a codified means of providing developmental 
assistance while on the other hand, China uses different methods that do not necessarily meet 
OECD standards. The Chinese, on the other hand, have developed a policy of non-
interference in domestic matters. This is, of course, a matter that will not be focused on in this 
paper. The different methodological starting points as far as Japanese and Chinese 
engagements are important to highlight before any analysis of FOCAC and TICAD can 
happen.      
Comparative studies are particularly helpful when one seeks to understand of mutual 
influences. In this case, Japan and China are competing for East Asian powers on the African 
continent. Their engagements with African states ought to be analysed for the purposes of 
having a better understanding of Japanese and Chinese foreign policies. The methodology fits 
my study in that both China and Japan are two powerful Asian states in pursuit of influence 
on the African continent.  Their rivalry makes this case interesting in that one can clearly see 
what China and Japan are both doing on the continent after going through this study. 
Six thematic areas crucial to African development can be summed as (1) Private Sector (2) 
Human Capital Development (3) Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security (4) 
Agriculture/ Blue Economy and Environment (5) Regional Integration and Infrastructure 
(Transport, Energy and Communication) and (6) Social and Cultural Development (Youth 
and Woman) will be used to analyse Japanese and Chinese contribution to African 
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development. It is important that these themes are present in the AU’s Agenda 2063.In 
addition, they feature in NEPAD work.  
TICAD started in 1993 thus giving it an 8-year head start to FOCAC that commenced in 
2001. When analysing both Japan and China involvement, the study will analyse broadly on 
the previous summits and their outcomes in relation to the thematic areas paramount to 
African development.  This means analysis of the first TICAD and FOCAC will be taken, 
however, due to the broadness of the frameworks functions the paper will primarily look at 
the most recent outcome documents in the mentioned specific areas.   
African scholars and policy makers can make use of this study to fully understand the 
frameworks themselves as well as the broader trajectory of Chinese and Japanese foreign 
policy in Africa. As more states seek to have better relations with African states using the AU 
as their gateway to bilateral relations, Africans need not be bystanders of multilateral 
platforms such as Africa-EU, Africa-USA, Africa-Japan, Africa-China, Africa-India, Africa-
Arab League of States, Africa-South America, Africa-Turkey, and Africa-Korea partnerships. 
Exploiting these strategic relationships like TICAD and FOCAC will result in better relations 
that will promote better economic and diplomatic relations.   
Journal articles, newspaper articles, agendas and outcomes of TICAD and FOCAC summits 
will be used in this research. Information from credible think tanks and developmental 
organisations will be paramount in this research. Journal articles, newspaper articles, 
meetings agenda’s and outcomes, as well as speeches, will be used to extract valuable 
information in understanding the works of TICAD and FOCAC in African development. 
 
Hypothesis 
  
The FOCAC and TICAD competing frameworks aimed at complementing both Japanese and 
Chinese foreign policies in African states.  Japan and China are competing for East Asian 
powers using different mechanisms in their foreign policies to gain soft power.  
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Dissertation Roadmap 
  
The paper will consist of six chapters. The Chapter One serves  as an introductory chapter; 
Chapter Two will identify the AU development agenda as well as elaborate some of the key 
developmental institutions ideas about development; Chapter Three will focus on TICAD in 
explaining how the platform is built up and its key achievements since inception; Chapter 
Four will pay attention to FOCAC while looking at its functions and its preoccupations; 
Chapter five will serve as comparative chapter in comparing and contrasting FOCAC and 
TICAD and Chapter Six will discuss the paper's findings and conclusion .    
Literature Review  
 
Woods, Kabell, Sagasti & Muwanga argued that there is a silent revolution going on in 
international development cooperation, with an increasing number of “new” or “emerging” 
donors quietly offering alternatives to aid- receiving countries15. The establishment of 
FOCAC and TICAD against the backdrop of developmental assistance dominated by 
Western powers in Africa evidently shows that Asian powers are finding their place in fast 
changing political and economic African landscape. Research carried out by Stones notes that 
big donors use aid as a carrot and stick mechanism to sway developing states to support their 
interests far beyond the United Nations (UN)16.  On the other hand, Lagerkvist & Johsson 
(2011) note that the new South-South cooperation, and particularly Asian-African 
partnerships in various forms, is clearly deepening economic and political relations with 
African countries, leading to the drawing of geo-economic boundaries and the geopolitical 
map of Africa. There is no doubt that the re-emergence of China at the turn of the 21st century 
has enhanced international interests in Africa particularly that of Japan.    
Arguments against aid and unbalanced relations between Africa and the western states are not 
new to International Relations scholarship. Aid has often been thought to be harmful to 
African development17.Walter Rodney18 and Samir Amin19 are examples of scholars who 
                                                          
15 Wood, B; Kabell, D; Sagasti, F; Muwanga N(2008), Synthesis Report on the First Phase of the Evaluation of 
the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Copenhagen.   
16 Stone, R. (2010) Buying Influence: Development Aid between the Cold War and the War on Terror. 
University of Rochester. 
17 Moyo D (2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa. The Penguin 
Group, London. 
18 Walter Rodney (1972), How Europe underdeveloped Africa. (London: Bogle- L’Ouverture Publications.  
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provide insightful discussions on unequal development. It is the continued reliance on aid that 
perpetuates unequal development to some degree. More recently, Dambisa Moyo introduced 
dead aid concept that diagnosis African stagnant development due to the continued provision 
of aid.  Her thinking framework follows the long-established chain of thought in Dependicia 
theory which developed after the Prebish-Singer thesis20. This argument is well explained by 
Bubu (1981) who argued that dependence generates a special umbilical cord that ties African 
economies to the Metropolitan, thereby distorting their traditional economies21.  
There are lot theories in the International Relations discipline that attempt to explain why 
states provide developmental assistance. The following theoretical discussions have been 
chosen because they best explain the current debates on Japanese and Chinese engagements 
with African states.  Academic research has shown that reasons behind foreign development 
assistance differ with a wide range of reasons from pure humanitarian altruism to selfish 
nationalist interests22. Little has been done to understand the phenomenon of developmental 
aid through organised single donor-multiple recipient platforms like FOCAC, TICAD and 
IAFS that now increasingly involving trade and business in their agendas. 
Marxism and Critical Theory  
 
Lancaster (2008)23 and Haan (2009)24 argue that Marxist theories support the thinking 
framework that places development assistance at the core of preserving capitalist 
exploitation.  Hook (1995) goes as far as calling ODA an instrument of the centre for the 
purposes of institutionalising the dependency between the centre and the periphery25. Japan is 
implicated in this allegation while on the other hand, China is not a member of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  Schraeder is of the view that ODA maintains 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19 Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1976); Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1978).  
20 Also see Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Beyond borders: Thinking critically about 
global issues.  
21 Babu, A. M. 1981. African Socialism or Socialist Africa. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. 
 
22 Nuechterlein, DE (1976), ‘National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and 
Decision-Making’, British Journal of International Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 246-266. 
23 Lancaster, C (2007), Foreign aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
24 Haan, Ad (2009), How the aid industry works: an introduction to international development, Kumarian Press, 
Sterling, VA. 
25 Hook, SW (1993), Foreign policy and systematic adaptation: official development assistance strategies of 
four major donors, 1980-1989.  
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the North-South division between poor and rich countries so therefore international 
organisations should be tasked with providing developmental assistance26.   
This thinking framework brings China and Japan as core countries that have interests of 
exploiting African states. The contributions of TICAD and FOCAC are therefore seen as 
gimmicks in looting African wealth while mendaciously advancing the development rhetoric. 
Africa, therefore, remains only as a source of natural resources and market for Japanese and 
Chinese finished products. In multilateral forums like UN and WTO African states can be 
viewed as pawns in broader power games between major powers. In sum, this thinking 
framework places the TICAD and FOCAC frameworks in a zero-sum game where both Japan 
and China are winners while African states are the biggest losers. 
Realism and Neorealism 
 
Realism is anchored by the central idea of state survival in an increasingly anarchical 
international global system. The maintenance of state power through military power is seen 
as a prerequisite for subsistence of the state27. Mearsheimer a renowned scholar in realist 
thought supports the superiority of power and security by stating that ‘The greater the 
military advantage one state has over other states28. Realists argue that developmental aid 
should be tied to strategic security.  
During the Cold War, most scholars agreed that states provide aid purely out of national 
security and self-preservation motives. This assumption holds that states in need of aid will 
be given if they do not offer any significant alliance. Schraeder, McKinlay and Steven Hook 
are some of the leading researchers supporting this theory. McKinlay concludes that the 
humanitarian theory, though providing a simple moral relationship between donors and aid, is 
flawed29. Steven Hook argues that foreign aid is given purely out of national interest. In his 
book, National Interests and Foreign Aid, he states that "the fundamental principle of aid 
giving as 'the price of affluence' has been accepted by nearly all industrialised states, which 
                                                          
26 Schraeder, PJ, Hook, S.W. and Taylor, B (1998), ‘Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, 
Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows’, World Politics, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 297-323. 
27 Hollis, M & Smith, S (1990), Explaining and understanding international relations, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, England. 
28  Mearshimer ,J (2006), The false promise  of international institutions,  Political Science Department at 
University of Chicago. 
29 McKinlay, R.D, ( 1979) The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distributions of 
Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960-1970." 
Comparative Political Studies 11.4.  
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have added the fiscal aid institutional components of foreign aid to their diplomatic 
arsenal”30.  
The neo-realist theory is the most recent theory explaining why states give aid. It is the 
widely accepted within the International Relations discipline. There is a significant shift from 
the realist assumption that held national interests as the main reason behind motivations for 
giving aid. Neo-realist argues that national interests and self-preservation are still crucial 
however economic interests are the main reason states. This means that donors will give more 
aid to the countries that have the most to offer them by way of exports, access to raw 
materials, and industrial competitiveness31. Schraeder found that economic interests 
dominated Japan's motivation, with the top recipients providing essential raw materials for 
Japanese industry, serving as a potential source of such raw materials, or providing major 
markets for Japanese products32.   
In short, the neorealist school of thought is a variation of the realist thinking framework. 
Security and power are safeguarded through the economic power which should be secured 
through foreign assistance. Economic power goes hand in hand with a substantial budget 
aimed at foreign assistance.  Hook; Schraeder; Wendt provide leading scholarly work that 
supported the latter argument. Situating TICAD and FOCAC in this framework means that 
China gives African states more developmental aid for its economic reasons. Its increased 
economic power also meant increased assistance to African states. The idealist assumption 
which holds that goodwill forms part of the reason debunks this thinking framework.  China, 
for example, has a long history of friendship with African states dating back the pre-
independence era when Beijing supported liberation struggle movements through the 
provision of arms and finance despite being economically weak. 
 
Constructivism  
 
The end of the Cold War brought remarkable changes to international politics in so doing; it 
also changed some core assumptions of traditional IR theories. According to (Price & Reus-
                                                          
30 Hook, S ( 1995) , National Interests and Foreign Aid , Rienner Publisher.  
31  Tuman, John P., Craig F. Emmert and Robert E. Sterken (2001) Explaining Japanese Aid Policy in Latin 
America: A Test of Competing Theories. Political Research Quarterly. 
32 Schrader, P (1999), Japan’s  Quest for Influence in Africa, Current History  98 (628).  
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Smit, 1998), neorealism was found wanting when explaining some of the occurrences in the 
global arena33. The provision of developmental assistance changed after the world moved 
from a bipolar setup. Wendt indicates that the main difference between neorealist and 
constructivists lays in the assumption that for the former the structure of the international 
relations system is made of material capabilities, whereas for the latter it also includes social 
relationships34.Social structures, identity, expectations, self-perception, ideas, values, 
knowledge and norms are pillars of constructivism.   
Constructivism sees foreign aid as a set of norms and ideas that have been constructed by 
states. It holds that states that are better off than others have the moral obligation to give a 
helping hand. Humanitarian convictions and moral values are also central to constructivism 
in that economic and political interests alone cannot sustain the provision of foreign aid.  The 
ODA which Japan plays a central role is an example of how constructivism assumptions can 
be seen in direct foreign aid policy. China has rejected some of the norms and values 
enshrined by the ODA. The idea of non-interference remains central in Beijing’s foreign 
policy toolkit. China has been accused of supporting the abuse of human rights. African states 
like Angola, Zimbabwe and Sudan have close relationships with Beijing and are also major 
beneficiaries China’s aid.  On the other hand, Japan refrains from providing foreign aid to 
African states accused of human rights abuse as per ODA standards.  
 
Soft Power  
 
Nye popularised the concept of soft power a phenomenon in foreign affairs that has bloomed 
in the post-Cold War era. In the book ‘Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American 
Power’35. Nye argues that when one country gets other countries to want what it wants might 
be called co-optive or soft power. The way big powers have been using aid supports this 
argument. Global powers and regional powers aid budgets are closely linked with their 
interests.  Japan and China are known to provide more developmental assistance to countries 
that are rich in natural resources. Nye further argues that a state’s soft power is produced by 
                                                          
33 Price, R & Reus-Smit, C (1998), ‘Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism’, 
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 259-294.  
34 Wendt, A (1995), ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 71-81. 
35Nye (1990), Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basic Books. 
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three resources – culture, foreign policy and political value36. Soft power and aid are 
therefore linked due to wealthy states increased reliance on assistance to win over allies.    
Xi Jinping in 2014 declared that China will increase its soft power and give a good Chinese 
narrative. Japan’s soft power has not traditionally been influential in Africa compared to 
another major, and traditional, partner countries. Japan’s foreign policy in Africa has been 
revolved around the projection of soft power, mainly in the form of developmental assistance 
through. The re-emergence of Asia in Africa has resulted in China and Japan competing for 
soft power. Japan’s increased interest on the continent to most analysts is a move to counter 
Chinese growing soft power37.   
Soft power embraces most theoretical explanations to why states provide foreign assistance. 
To some extent, it acts as an umbrella thinking framework in which different theories can fit 
in explaining states behaviour when offering aid. The Marxist and Critical Theory fits in the 
soft power debate in that core states (Japan/China) should develop a relationship with the 
periphery (African states) for the purposes of benefitting from its natural resources and 
markets.   
This study will be guided by Nye’s soft power understanding that argues that political values, 
culture and foreign policy are central in co-opting states as opposed to hard power in the form 
of military force and economic sanctions. In this study, soft power supports the hypothesis 
that China’s FOCAC and Japan’s TICAD support of the African Union development agenda 
as means of gaining influence which has economic dividends. The Foreign policy supported 
by soft power is therefore essential particularly to states competing for interests like Japan 
and China.   
 
Conclusion 
  
Andrew J Nathan and Robert Ross explained in their book China’s New Foreign Policy 
Strategy: The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress that the rising China will not necessarily 
                                                          
36 Nye Joseph (2004), Soft Power – the means to success in world politics, Public Affairs, New York. 
37  Tiezzi, S., ‘Africa: China and Japan’s next battleground?’, The Diplomat, 15 January 
2014, http://thediplomat.com. 
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become a threat.38 Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro in Coming Conflict with China, 
predicted an inevitable conflict with Asia and even more so with the United States, however, 
China’s foreign policy in the last decades has proven this hypothesis wrong. China has been 
careful building its soft power without clashing with traditional powerhouses like the United 
States.  
Japan on the hand due its close relations with the USA and the European Union and its rise 
due to its rapid industrialisation with other Asian Tigers managed to grow soft power in 
Africa. The soft power, however, has been waning and is challenged by China. Japan is 
however disadvantaged because of its poor historical relations with African states.  
Different theories have been discussed in trying to understand the motivations behind 
developmental aid to Africa. Soft power argument by Joseph Nye has been chosen as the 
leading theoretical framework that satisfies China’s involvement through FOCAC.  The 
chapter has pointed out that TICAD and FOCAC are both ambitious platform used by Japan 
and China to help with their relations with African states. Comparative analysis will be the 
basis of which the research will be conducted. The dissertation will give the reader a clear 
understanding of what the Japanese and the Chinese are doing on the African continent. A 
brief historical analysis will be employed for the sake of better understanding China and 
Japan relationship with Africa before FOCAC and TICAD. The aim of the study is not to 
give judgement no which actor has been more beneficial to the African continent. The 
dissertation will take a neutral stance in all six chapters and aim to give fair analysis based on 
statistics as well as existing policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Nathan, Andrew J and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China Search for Security, New 
York, W.W. Norton, 1997.  
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Chapter 2: Understanding the African Development Agenda 
 
Introduction 
 
African development is no doubt one of the most researched and discussed the subject in 
academia and other fields. The continent has been labelled a hopeless continent and rising 
continent in last 30 years. Poor development on the African continent cannot be divorced 
from the history of slavery and colonialism that directly affected African progression. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive report on African development 
strategies that the OAU and subsequently AU implemented since 1963. It is important to 
understand the historical context of how African people have conceptualised development as 
well as the programmes they have implemented. China and Japan have shown willingness to 
assist African development nonetheless it is crucial to interrogate this development, the 
different actors and policies that have been implemented.  
This chapter also situates developmental assistance in African development chronicles. The 
chapter will be structured as follows: 1); Analysis of African development discourse 2); Key 
institutions shaping African development 3); Situating development in foreign assistance 4); 
Agenda 2063 &SDGs  5); Chronology of African Developmental policies 6); Conclusion. 
The chapter aims to give the reader a synopsis on theoretical discussions, policies and trends 
in African development. In addition, the chapter will briefly situate TICAD and FOCAC in 
African development setting. 
Theoretical frameworks and discussions around African Development    
 
The history of African development discourse  
In his book ‘Encountering Development’ Arturo Escobar argues that during colonial times 
the concern about poverty was conditioned by the belief that even if the “native” could be 
somewhat enlightened by the presence of the coloniser not much could be done about their 
poverty because their economic development was pointless39. This framework changed post -
World War II after the establishment of the United Nations an organisation which has been 
                                                          
39 Escobar Autro, 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, New 
Jersey: Princetown University Press.  
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the centre of development discourse. Bretton Woods institutions (IMF/World Bank) have also 
played a significant role even though they are viewed as less progressive.  
Kubaya argues that development is a process of improving people’s lives40. Kubuya further 
argues that development should encompass the ability to meet basic needs and to sustain 
economic growth, alleviation of poverty, the creation of wealth, and economic freedom. 
Development has recently been inclusive through the inclusion of women status and quality 
of life necessities in African development.  One notable thinking framework is that of 
‘Freedom as Development’ by economist Amartya Sen41. Sen his Nobel Prize in Economics 
winning book claims that free market enhances freedoms.  The latter is however contested.  
African states were unable to meet the UN’s MDGs, this means that substantial amount of 
catching up to global development is still necessary.  Ideas about development change from 
time to time, however, as far Africa is concerned poverty reduction, creating employment, 
ending conflicts. In sum, meeting basic human needs is very crucial for African states. People 
oriented development will empower the human capital that Africa is blessed with; a young 
population capable of bringing meaningful change on the continent.  
 
Dependecia 
  
The fight over influence between the Soviet Union and the USA during the Cold War led to 
significant changes in developmental assistance to the developing world, particularly in 
Africa. Left-inclined theories, as opposed to the neoclassical thinking, became popular in 
newly independent African states. The unequal exchange (Arghiri Emmanuel42), structural 
alliance (Raul Prebisch)43, dependency (Hans Singer44 /Fernado Cardos45) world systems 
                                                          
40 Kabuya FI (2007). Economics for African Nations: Principles, Problems and Policies (1st edition). Trafford 
Publishing Company, Victoria, Canada. 
41 Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as freedom (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press  
 
42Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal exchange; A study of the imperialism of trade.  
43 Prebisch, Raúl (1959). "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries". American Economic Review. 
49: 251–273.  
44 Singer, Hans (1998) The South Letter (30) "The Terms of Trade Fifty Years Later - Convergence and 
Divergence. 
45 Carlos A. Martínez-Vela (2003) World Systems Theory, paper prepared for the Research Seminar in 
Engineering Systems. 
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theory (Immanuel Wallerstain46) are good examples.  The latter frameworks have been 
supported by leading African scholars. The global economic system according to many 
leading African scholars like Claude Ake, Bade Onimode, Nzongola-Ntalaja, Peter Anyang’ 
N’yongo is rigged in that Africans are at the receiving end of global capitalism. Walter 
Rodney is another notable scholar that argued that Europe intentionally underdeveloped the 
African continent through slavery and colonialism.  
 
Neo-patrimonialism 
   
Mkandawire advances the neo-patrimonial framework, whereby Africans should begin taking 
responsibility for the lack of development47. Colins Brobbery argues that neopatrimonialism 
has extensively been conceptualised to cover, the nature of African state including; the level 
of authority, power politics, political legitimacy, elections, corruption, nepotism, paternalism, 
cronyism, privatisation and presidentialism just to mention few of the contemporary rubric of 
neopatrimonialism concept48. The ‘big man49’ syndrome is associated with this set up where 
leaders often rely on corrupt and undemocratic means of staying in power. Power is 
maintained through a well organised patron-client relationship amongst the elites. Often, the 
state becomes the vehicle for self-enrichment through looting of state coffers and aid money. 
Institutions are systematically eroded often leading decision-making in the hands of very few 
elites.  It is therefore not surprising that having good political institutions and good 
governance are leading items on the African development agenda gave Africa’s track record 
with authoritarian leaders50.   
 
                                                          
46 Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press. 
47 Thandika Mkandawire (16 October 1998). "Thinking About Developmental States in Africa". African 
Economic Research Consortium. African Development in the 21st Century. United Nations University. 
48 Colins Adu -Bempah Brobbey (2003), Neopatrimonialism and Democratic Stability in Africa: A case of 
Ghana’s 1992 Redemocratisation, Ghana Institute of Journalism. University of Ghana.  
49 see Meredith, M. (2005). The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. New York, NY: Public 
Affairs and Hyden, G. (2006). African Politics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
50 Rod Alence ( 2004). Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Cambridge University Press. 
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Resource Curse 
  
The resource curse theory gained ground in explaining why African states fail to develop and 
in some cases collapse. Theorists supporting this line of thought are prone to democratic 
deficiencies, violent conflict and economic instability due to client and patron nature of 
politics.  Sachs and Warner go as far as arguing that a surprising feature of modern economic 
growth is that economies with abundant natural resources have tended to grow slower than 
economies without substantial resources51. The resource curse also is known as ‘paradox of 
plenty’ is evident in resource-rich countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and Angola.  
 
Neo-liberalism  
 
Neo-liberalism was popularised in Africa in the 1980s by Thatcher and Regan free market 
capitalism52. The state takes a limited role in economics while free markets dictate the rule of 
the game53. In Africa, neo-liberalism was introduced through Structural Adjustment 
Programmes which were forced upon African governments by attaching conditionalities to 
loans from the IMF and World Bank.  A lot of African countries have rejected the call for 
their economies to be left at the mercy of free markets. Instead, they have attempted to copy 
the ‘East Asian Miracle’ or ‘Asian Tigers’ in carefully planning their economies as well as 
subsidising their industries54. South Africa is a good example of a state that has been trying to 
emulate the developmental state route. Neo-liberal policies are still cited as the antidote to 
African developmental problems however African leaders remain adamant on implementing 
them. An African head of states has openly criticised them, blaming them of the current 
economic doldrums that African states find themselves in.  
 
                                                          
51  Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner (1997) Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, 
Harvard University.  
52 Ali, A. (1998), ‘Structural Adjustment and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa,’ in T.Mkandawire and C.Soludo 
(eds), African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, Ottawa, IDRC. 
53 Patrick Bond and George Dor ( 2003) Neoliberalism and Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa, Discussion 
paper for the Regional Network for Equity in Health in Southern Africa.  
54 Joel Netshitenzhe ( 2011) South Africa’s Developmental Capacity, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic 
Reflection.  
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Chronology of African Developmental Policies 
    
Post-independent Africa through the OAU had its own development plans. The Lagos Plan of 
Action and the Abuja Treaty are some examples of the OAU’s development policies which 
analyst argue authentically Africa owned.  NEPAD by the AU continues to carry some of the 
fundamental ideas that have always shaped African discourses. The AU prioritised 
regionalism when it transitioned from OAU to AU. As a reaction to continued external 
intervention in African economic agenda’s the development policies outlook has been 
emphasising human centred development with the full participation of African citizens. One 
can argue that self-reliance, increased intra-Africa trade and regional integration is key 
features in the AU’s policies. These are necessities for meaningful Africa led growth on the 
continent.  
Latin America is where most of Africa development ideas are exported from. Raul Presbish 
popularised the dependency theory which has shaped African political landscapes. Currently, 
NEPAD and Agenda 2063 serve as economic developments driving the AU development 
trajectories. NEPAD’s formation in 2001 with a mandate to propel economic co-operation 
and integration amongst African countries was a positive step towards collective economic 
development. In addition, one can argue NEPADS’s work and the establishment of Agenda 
2063 has revitalised African development and furthered African reach into global markets.    
Regardless of external interferences in African economic and political governance, African 
leaders have always have been on the forefront of steering uniquely African development 
ideas with people centred policies. To some extent, certain policies have been previously 
crafted to counter external interference. The Lagos Plan of Action, for example, was in 
response to dependence that had been caused by reliance on foreign powers resulting in poor 
economic growth and lack of self-sufficiency. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
directed by Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF/World Bank) had forced African states to 
implement “free market” economic reforms that removed governance from the people and 
placed it in powerful institutions that prioritised economic returns over ordinary people’s 
wellbeing.  
The following are notable homegrown policies that have been fostered by the OAU and AU. 
It is important to have a chronology of these policies for the purposes of tracing African 
development route as well as interpret its characteristics.    
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The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) 
 
The Lagos Plan of Action was an unprecedented move by an African head of states when 
they assembled in Lagos from the 28th to 29th of 1980 and unanimously adopted the ‘Lagos 
Plan of Action for the economic development of Africa, 1980-2000’55. This was Africa’s 
pioneering economic summit. Adebayo Adedeji hails it as the Africa’s ‘Magna Carta’56 
because of it is long-term plan to restructure Africa’s socio-economic development. The 
plan’s theoretical and intellectual foundations can be traced to the Monrovia Strategy. The 
Monrovia Strategy was collaborative work between the OAU and the United Nation’s 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in response to African economic crisis of the late 
1970s57. Recently adopted Agenda 2063 borrows from the 3 strategic visions namely: The 
Monrovia Strategy; The Lagos Plan of Action and The Final Act of Lagos Plan.   
 
Structural Adjustment Programmes  
 
In 1981, the World Bank and the UNDP sponsored a study titled ‘Towards Accelerated 
Development in Africa’ commonly known as the Berg Report58. The report diagnosed Africa 
development problems as primarily internal mismanagement. The report was the basis of 
SAPs which prescribed that African governments do the following: devalue their national 
currencies and adopt a floating exchange regime; deregulation of domestic interest’s rates; de 
-control of prices; elimination of subsidies; liberalisation of external trade and financial 
transfer; privatisation of state-owned enterprises and reduction in size of public spending59. It 
is important to note that not only African states were forced to implement these draconian 
policies but also the rest of the developing world.   
                                                          
55 Adebayo Adedeji (1984) The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action for African Development, Text 
of a paper presented at the ECA/Dalhousie Universitylliliversity Conference on the Lagos Plan of Action and 
Africa's Future International Relations: Projections and Implications for Policy-Makers.  
56 Ibid  
57 Adebayo Adedeji, (1983) The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: A Regional 
Approach to Economic Decolonization NISER Distinguished Lecture series, University of Ibadan. 
58 Patrick Bond , (2006) Reconciliation and Economic Reaction : Flaws in South Africa’s Elite TransitionTranstion 
Reconciliation and Economic Reaction.  Journal of International Affairs.  
59  Lensink, Robert (1996). Structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa (1st ed.). Longman. 
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SAPs have been labelled a form of neo-colonialism which enabled developed states and 
international institutions to dictate African governance. The main criticism is that the policies 
were not Africa owned nor were they people oriented. The ECA argued that the SAPs 
policies were informed by sound econometric principles but failed because the programmes 
did not resonate with realities on the ground, in that they failed to capture the political, social, 
economic, cultural and economic conditions of African people. The criticism of SAPs is 
widespread and well documented on the African continent mainly because the policies 
unleashed havoc on African people due to the removal of government from the people 
leading to calamities in health care and education.   
 
Post -Lagos Plan of Action 
 
A number of policies have been implemented on the continental scale since the end of the 
Cold War. It is crucial to understand that the Cold War had significant benefits for African 
states who received support from the Soviet Union and the USA as they rivalled in getting 
influence60. After the LPA nothing substantially new was drafted rather they were fine tuning 
and revising the plans agreed upon in 1980. Pressure from donors and financial institutions 
resulted in the PLA plans being placed on hold. It's important to note that post LPA policies 
have increasingly been pro-exogenous and have supported neoliberal policies. A series of 
policies were implemented and they are as follows:   
 
1. Africa’s Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER), UNPAAERD (1986) 
& AFF-SAP (1989)  
2. The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program for Socio-
economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) – 1989)  
3. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation 
(Arusha, 1990)  
4. The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in Africa and 
the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990) 
                                                          
60 Keith Griffen (1991) Foreign Aid after the Cold War, International Institute for Social Studies.  
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5. The OAU Re-launching of Africa’s Economic and Social Development: The Cairo 
Agenda for Action (1995) 
 
NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development & Agenda 2063  
 
Post-independence African leaders largely subscribed to the dependecia school of thought 
which characterised the international global economy as hostile to Africa and inherently 
exploitative. Deep rooted mistrust of global economy resulted in the LPA being adopted at 
the first ever African economic summit in Lagos.  Post-OAU leadership at the AU led by 
South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki and Nigeria’s Obasanjo realised that globalisation could be used 
to African benefit61. The organisation was tasked with bringing Africa back into the global 
economy and assist in creating conditions for the continent to contribute meaningfully in 
global affairs.  
NEPAD is distinguishable due to its five main pillars, they are namely: Peace, Security, 
Democracy and Political Governance Initiative, Economic and Corporate Governance 
Initiative; Human Resource Development Imitative; Capital Flows Initiative and Market 
Access Initiative62. These pillars support the founding mandate of eradicating poverty and 
bringing about sustainable growth and development63.  In addition, the institution is aimed at 
having a 7 percent GDP growth and to attract $67 million in FDI’s annually64. The 
organisation was at the forefront of the UN’s MDGS and currently supports SDGs.  Some of 
its core tasks are resource mobilisation, addressing priorities and creating preconditions for 
development65. There are arguments that critic NEPAD and APRM as tools by African 
governments to meet minimum requirements to access ODA and FDI, debt cancellation from 
developed states. The institutions are therefore not genuine drivers of development but rather 
tools used to access foreign aid.  
NEPAD has been credited for its practical ways of integrating the continent as opposed to the 
rhetoric of a United States of Africa without measures of making it a reality. The organisation 
                                                          
61 Abel Ezeoha & Chibuike Uche (2005), South Africa, NEPAD and the African Renaissance, African Studies 
Centre Leiden, The Netherlands, ASC Working Paper 64.  
62 NEPAD (2009) The AU/NEPAD Capacity Development Strategic Framework (CDSF). Midrand: NEPAD 
Secretariat. 
63 Ibid 
64 NEPAD. (2001) www.nepad.org\2005\doc.php. 
65  NEPAD. Op Cit. 2001, p. 1-5. 
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has been working closely with the ECA and institution that has been central in producing 
authentically Africa ideas about development. NEPAD has had the ability to work with 
different partners through for example its G8-NEPAD partnership, African Development 
Bank, United Nations and other institutions thereby bringing different stakeholders to African 
development66.  
What makes NEPAD exceptional is its ability to have an outward looking development 
trajectories informed by liberal economic policies?. It also strikes the balance by having an 
emphasis on governance as an antidote to African development woes as opposed to purely 
economic emphasise. NEPAD has the Africa Peer Review Mechanism as its governance arm 
dedicated to bringing accountability between African states. To date, the APRM remains 
Africa’s most innovative and ambitious initiative on governance. Since its launch in 2003, the 
institution has promoted self – and peer assessment of government policies and practices67. 
The APRM core mission is deepening best practices and development of tools and methods 
by which the deficiencies can be corrected68. To date, 37 countries have signed up with 21 
having completed APRM Country Review Missions. The organisation is currently 
undergoing revitalization to align its policies with that of AU’s Agenda 2063 and UN 2030 
SDGs.  
 
Agenda 2063  
 
The rise of globalisation pushed the African States to re-engage their stance of shunning the 
world through domestic-oriented policies. African states realised that they were not existing 
in a vacuum but rather and an increasingly globalised and complex world regardless of the 
unfortunate history of slavery and colonialization, the continent had to re-engage the global 
world. The opening words of the document ‘The Africa We Want’ enchants the gained 
agency or rather the coming back to the global arena with African terms. The document is an 
ambitious vision guided by 7 aspirations which are as follows: 1. A prosperous Africa based 
                                                          
66 Francis Nguendi Ikome (2004)From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to Partnership for African’s Development 
(NEPAD) The Political Economy of African Regional Initiatives.  International Relations at the School of the 
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on inclusive growth and sustainable development; 2. An integrated continent, politically 
united, based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance; 3. An 
Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; 4. A 
peaceful and secure Africa; 5. An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, 
values and ethics;  6. An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential 
of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and 7. Africa as a 
strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner. 
The economic blueprint incorporates most of Africa’s previous policies and reads with 
optimism. It is supported by a ten-year plan with sets of targets and evaluation mechanisms. 
It is structured in 6 chapters that not only give the background of African development 
history but also shows the methods in which the continent will finance and support its plans. 
The document has been criticised for having unclear means of its financing. Donor/ Partners 
funding is highlighted as a major financier of the plan despite previous disappointments in 
funding pledges. It is therefore not a wise move to list external partners as credible funders of 
this developmental plan.  
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The following is a chronology of African development policies  
 
 
 
 
The Monrovia Declaration (1979) 
 
The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) 
 
The Final Act of Lagos (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991) 
 
OAU: Africa’s Priority Program for Economic Recovery (1986-1990) 
 
The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program for Socio-
economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) – (1989) 
 
The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation 
(Arusha, 1990) 
 
The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in Africa and the 
Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990) 
 
Organization of 
African Union (OAU) 
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The OAU Re-launching of Africa’s Economic and Social Development: The Cairo 
Agenda for Action (1995) 
 
 
 
NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001) 
 
Agenda 2063 
 
Institutions central to African Development 
 
African Development Bank  
 
African Development Bank (AfDB) was established in Khartoum, Sudan in 1963 with a 
mandate to promote economic and social development69. The bank became fully operational 
in 1963 and is currently based in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivore. Its membership consists of 54 
African countries and 26 non-African countries70. The bank has been instrumental in the 
creation of additional developmental institutions such as the Africa Export -Import Bank, 
Africa Project Development Facility and the Africa Capacity Building Foundation, just to 
name a few.   
The bank has traditionally supported infrastructure projects particularly in areas of power 
supply, water and sanitation, transport and communication. The bank is currently a leading 
agency supporting NEPAD and is APRM’s strategic partner. The banks voting powers, 
however, are largely still in foreign powers. The European Union controls 18.756 %, USA 
controls 9.281 %, Japan control 5.494 while Nigeria controls 9.281, making it the biggest 
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70 Ibid  
African Union (AU) 
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African voting power71. The African development bank should be credited for being a leading 
institution in supporting African development. 
 
 
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
 
As the wave for decolonization swept past Africa in the late 1950s, the UN decided to 
establish the Economic Commission for Africa in 1958. The organisation has been identified 
as one of the foremost think tanks behind progressive ideas about African development. The 
organisation was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council as one of 
the 5 regional commissions72. It derives its mandate from the UN’s Article 55, which calls for 
the promotion of high standard of living, full employment and conditions for economic and 
social progress and development73.  
Currently, the ECA covers 7 thematic areas which are Macroeconomic Policy, Regional 
Integration, Social Development, Natural Resources, Innovation and Technology, Gender and 
Governance. These are areas that Africa urgently need to target to have meaningful 
development74. Notable leaders at the ECA include Mekki Abbas (founding secretariat) and 
the renowned Pan-African scholar Adebayo Adedeji. The organisations continue to be the 
beacon of hope in producing tangible developmental ideas. The inclusion of Gender on its 
thematic areas is a welcome move on the continent where woman and children remain 
destitute.   
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
 
The UNDP was established in 1965 by UN member states to facilitate global development for 
all UN members75. The organisation has been publishing the Human Development Report 
since 1990. The report has been instrumental as a reputable indicator tracking global 
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development. The UNDP online indicates that the organisation aims to eradicate poverty, 
violence and hunger through assisting African countries in translating their economic growth 
into long-lasting, inclusive human development. The organisation supports MDGs, 
democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, environmental and energy, and 
woman empowerment. Work by the UNPD on the African continent shows that the 
organisation works closely with DAC of the OECD as well as regional institutions and 
economic communities.  
 
Bretton Wood Institutions  
 
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank were set up in 1944 as a vehicle to drive 
international economic cooperation. Ideas by Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes were 
instrumental in its foundation phase. The organisation on the African continent does not 
enjoy popularity due to the failed Structural Adjustment Programmes. The SAPs are credited 
for some of the developmental failures that African countries are facing today. The 
institutions have also been accused of supporting autocratic leaders in developing countries.  
The financing of Chile’s dictatorship and Mobutu’s Zaire have often cited as the institution's 
shortcomings76. Some critics go as far as arguing that the two institutions are an extension of 
Western economic power.  
The IMF and the World Bank have initiated the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and 
Debt Forgiveness programmes which have greatly benefited Africa whose countries need 
debt forgiveness77. Conditionalities are still part of the institution's policy. They have been 
strengthened particularly when it comes to a state’s fiscal policy and governance. Both the 
IMF and World Bank work closely with developmental partners in alleviating poverty. It is 
important to note that the Bretton Woods institutions have a strong commitment to making 
profit hence their motives in African development get questioned.   
 
Situating FOCAC & TICAD in African development  
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African states have not graduated from being a recipient of foreign aid after close to 60 years 
of constant provision. Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Thomas Sankhra and other 
respected statesman auctioned against dependence on developmental assistance.  Given the 
legacies of slavery and colonial rule, Africa has remained home to some of the poorest states 
in the world that desperately needed assistance. Poor macroeconomic performances because 
of draconian International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) resulted in worsening of poverty and underdevelopment of the African 
continent.  They all came in the name of developmental assistance.  
The AU’s development blueprint as the Agenda 2063 reads is focused on giving African 
countries autonomy and power as it participates in the global arena. An African block with 
power and influence will not need aid but business. Increasingly the TICAD and FOCAC 
frameworks have seen Business Forums being taken seriously on the frameworks meetings. 
Agreements to increase trade are signed with follow up targets being met in most cases. 
These ties in with Agenda 2063’s strategic partnership ideas as one of the drivers of 
development. Accessing how the Japanese and Chinese have contributed to the African 
Union developmental agenda is therefore crucial in understanding their respective 
relationship with the African Union.  
Agenda 2063 seeks to eliminate dependency by midwifing Africa states that are self-
sufficient and free from external influence. Critics of Agenda 2063 argue that it is vague and 
too ambitious while lacking solid funding mechanisms. Regardless of the criticism, Agenda 
2063 remains the leading plan of action at the continental level at encompasses overlapping 
institutional mandates for African developmental agenda. One can argue that UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), World Banks development ideas, as well as other sectoral 
institutions, are summed in Agenda 2063 making the most updated document encompassing 
all developmental trajectories. In addition, the development blueprint has a first ten-year 
implementation plan which was adopted with the overwhelming support of African stated in 
March 2015.   
Developmental aid has been changing over time. The last few decades have witnessed the 
increased role of new actors. The rise of China has resulted in the global South has a big 
donor that can identify with the struggles developing countries. Growth in African countries 
sparking the Africa rising phenomenon has also forced traditional actors to reprioritise 
African states in their foreign policies. The increasing significance of FOCAC, for example, 
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has been rivalled with the beefing up of the long established TICAD. Commitments to aid 
provision and access to funds have been doubled while new practices like hosting of summits 
on the African continent, prioritisation of the AU in planning and coordination and provision 
of better accountability measures.  
The debates about the effectiveness of development aid have been going on for long. The 
camp that argues that developmental aid has largely been fruitless because it leads to 
dependency, corruption and worsening of debt seem to the leading voice.  Japan received 
massive foreign aid injections in post-War 2 eras and China was a reception of aid for long.  
Today both states are major players in aid provision highlighting the fact that it is possible to 
graduate from the aid dependency syndrome. Aids, for example, has been fought on the 
African continent using developmental aid funds with positive results. China has also been 
making significant strides in big infrastructure development.  There is no need to throw the 
baby with the bathwater as far as aid is concerned. There are terrible outcomes that can be 
ratified. What is important is finding synergies between African development policies and 
developmental aid inclination moving African states towards the end goal of self-sustenance.  
 
Conclusion 
  
This chapter has focused on Africa’s development history and current trends. The evidence 
shows that African past policies have failed. One of the main reasons why the developmental 
policies failed is a failure of foreign powers in financing development plans. Dependency as 
result of constant handouts explains why African states remain the destination of foreign 
assistance. Other than dependency issues of resource curse and neo-patrimonialism are seen a 
major complication to African development ambitions.   
 African states on a regional scale have not been able to successfully implement a 
developmental policy. External influence has been detrimental as highlighted by undermining 
of the Lagos Plan and promotion of SAPs. NEPAD which has attempted to balance internal 
policies and external demands is argued to be a positive step by the AU in finding working 
solutions to issues faced by African states. Agenda 2063 are praised an ambitious plan that 
can be achieved if maximum effort is taken in owning the plans and accountability from 
partners.  
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A combination of global efforts and African efforts as seen by NEPAD/APRM and Agenda 
2063 as well as efforts from partners through FOCAC and TICAD initiatives should move 
Africa towards its goals of eradicating poverty, reducing unemployment, ending the conflict 
and having sustainable development. Development assistance has had inconsistencies mainly 
through corruption and worsening of debt and poverty. Increased actors and refining of the 
already existing practices promise to bring about new developments. It is these opportunities 
that African policy makers should take advantage of and leverage them to the needs of the 
continental development aims. 
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Chapter 3: China in Africa: An analysis of FOCAC in African Development  
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter is aimed at showcasing what the FOCAC framework has achieved in 
progressing the AU’s development agenda. It will first outline the major contributions of 
China at the AU. Emphasis will be given in showing how FOCAC operates and the major 
stakeholders involved. In hindsight of the previous FOCAC meetings, the chapter will look at 
China’s contributions to the following thematic areas: as (1) Private Sector (2) Human 
Capital Development (3) Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security (4) Agriculture and 
Environment (5) Regional Integration and Infrastructure (Transport, Energy and 
Communication) and (6) Social and Cultural Development (Youth and Woman).  In addition, 
the chapter will specifically look at what China has done to aid the AU capacity building, a 
necessity for development policies dispersion. The roadmap of this chapter clearly indicates 
the goal of investigating how far China has contributed to Africa’s development agenda. 
The building of soft power is the theoretical explanation of why FOCAC has been prioritised 
as China’s developmental assistance arm to Africa. Through huge infrastructure, soft loans 
and favourable trade deals, Beijing has gradually built up its soft power in Africa. This 
chapter will illustrate Nye’s argument that the ability to attract and co-opt rather than hard 
power is working for China in Africa.  
China’s soft power is driven by nationalism ideology from the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). The past two decades have witnessed the gradual rise of Chinese soft power. In 
Africa, China has expanded her economic interest in Africa by means of mutual development 
and investment, economic cooperation and trade. Relations between African states have been 
strengthened largely due to Beijing’s aid packages and diplomatic cooperation.  
Hu Jintao, the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group President and Chinese Communist 
Party Secretary-General noted the need for China to increase her influence when he said, 
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“that the increase of China’s international status and influence depends both on hard power, 
such the economy, science and technology, and defence, as well as on soft power, such as 
culture78. Given the heavy criticism of China’s of breaking international agreed standards of 
human rights, it is fitting for Beijing to build her influence globally. Building soft power is a 
way to advance China’s domestic and international agenda, to guard Beijing against criticism, 
and to boost the country’s international standing79. 
This chapter will discuss China’s relations with Africa through the FOCAC framework. It 
will argue that China has deliberately focused its energies to increase soft power in Africa. 
Africa, traditionally Europe’s is now a contested region with China, Japan, European Union 
and other rising powers. 
Since the 1980s China has displayed a significant rise to power because of the opening 
process and accelerated economic growth.80 Subsequently, China’s quest to grow its 
influence in Africa fits in Beijing’s broader global peaceful rise.   
 
China -Africa Relations: A close look at historical background 
 
In 2006, the Chinese government declared that China will ‘…unswervingly carry forward the 
tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both 
the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership 
with Africa’81. The formalising of the Sino-Africa relations in a post -1945 global world 
order is preceded by a rich history dating back to the Han Density (206 B. C. – A. D. 220).  
Since the establishment of China by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, warm relations 
between the people of China and African people have been maintained. Chinese support for 
African independence and the establishment through financing, training and supporting of 
African liberation struggle movements was instrumental in the decolonization of Africa82. In 
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the Post-colonial Africa, China/Africa relations can be characterised as having vibrant 
cooperative interdependence.  The Forum for China -Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
established in 2001 is the embodiment of the vibrancy. Scholars have argued that the 
relationship is a true reflection of the Bandung Spirit and the epitome of South -South 
cooperation.  
Over the past two decades, China’s relationship with the African continent has exponentially 
grown. China’s fast-paced industrialisation a result of the “Reform and Opening Up” policies 
spearhead by Deng Xiaoping brought about successful economic policies under the banner of 
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics”. African States relations with China were 
strengthening during the Cold War particularly through the solidarity stance Beijing took 
during the liberation struggle. China and Africa have a shared history of conquest and 
imperialism.  In addition, they also share a common history of glorious past with Africa being 
the home of modern day civilisation and China’s glorious dynasties and groundbreaking 
discoveries like gunpowder, compass, papermaking and iron and steel melting. Shelton notes 
that Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged Sino-Africa relations by pointing out 
that ‘as early as the 1950s and 1960s, China and Africa fought side by side in the historic 
struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemony and worked side by side in the hard 
endeavour to revive our respective economies83.    
Over the past few decades, China has been the developmental partner in assisting Africa to 
industrialise.  As an underdeveloped state in the early 1970s, China offered a helping hand to 
Africa by sponsoring the construction of the TAZARA railway linking up the landlocked 
Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam84.  It is important to note that Beijing’s foreign policy 
has been consistent since the 1950s with policies of no political strings and non-interference 
of domestic affairs as its cardinal pillars. The policy of non-interference has been attractive to 
African states who suffered the most during the Cold War’s proxy wars and remain 
vulnerable to regime changes sponsored by the Western States. African states responded to 
Beijing’s all weather friendship by overwhelmingly supporting China’s return to the United 
Nations. Of the 76 states voting in favour of Beijing, 26 of them were African.  The 
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appreciation of the support noted by Chairman Mao who clearly stated that ‘it was the black 
African friends that carried us back in’85.  
The new African Union’s headquarters worth $200 million in total built by the Chinese 
government is yet another powerful tribute to China-Africa relations. China’s foreign policy 
towards Africa since 1950s is as follows: (i) 1950s -1970s were marked by the ‘Eight 
Principles of Foreign and Technical Aid.’ 800 projects consisting of fisheries, transport, 
agriculture, textiles communications, hydro-dams, education and energy were completed86. 
(ii) 1970s-1980s were highlighted by the construction of the TAZARA railway and logistical 
as well as financial support for liberation struggle movements on the continent.  (iii) The 
1980s -1990s are regarded as the ‘golden era of China-Africa relations since 1949’87.  
Bilateral head of states exchanges and increased investments were witnessed between China 
and Africa. The African diplomatic community including presidents and prime ministers 
supported China during the trying times of the ‘Tiananmen incident’ in 1989.  (iv) 1990s-
2000s resulted in improved cooperation after African states suffered from an economic 
decline in the 1980s. The 1980s also commonly known as ‘the lost decade’ is remembered by 
numerous civil wars, negative effects of structural adjustment programmes and Western aid 
fatigue. China was at the time going through massive economic changes resulting in a 
situation where Africa needed China and China need Africa thereby fostering a symbiotic 
relationship.   
FOCAC has massive potential to become a sustainable platform to sustain Sino-Africa 
relations into the 21st century.  As the African Union (AU) advances its Agenda 2063 policy 
shaped by key pillars of good governance, increased economic growth and on the other hand 
China is realising its “Two Centenary Goals” aimed at building a prosperous society by 2021, 
simultaneously with the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party.  Concurrently, as 
the AU aspires to industrialise and have a modern and peaceful Africa by 2063, China plans 
to have an affluent, strong, civilised and harmonious modern society by 2049. Although 
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geographically not all of Africa is part of China’s ambitious, ‘Silk Road Economic Belt and 
the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’, engaging Africa at large. 
It is paramount for the AU’s development policies to align themselves with the broader 
Chinese global developmental vision88. While analysing policy one can clearly see that 
Beijing’s domestic policy and global foreign policy trajectories are aligned with Africa’s 
regional policy framework. The FOCAC’s achievements within a short period of 15 years are 
therefore important to reflect in order usher in sustainable future engagements. 
In sum, Sino-Africa relations are characterised by solidarity in shared ideology and political 
aspirations. China and African states have rallied together to defeat colonialism and are 
embarking on developing agendas aimed at empowering their people.  Ebberson, editor of the 
awards winning journal, Debate narrated the Sino-Africa relations by saying,  
“China’s approaches Africa with what has been called the complete approach the complete 
package.  Technical expertise that includes their own skilled workers, a persuasive line about 
also having been victims of colonialism, influence at the UN and money in the form of big 
soft loans that have no strings attached, make a seductive combination”. 
The FOCAC institution has therefore been used to extend China’s foreign policy through 
attractive means like solidarity in multilateral institutions and aid in forms of much-needed 
loans and investments.  China’s interests are characterised by Xi Jiping as ‘Soft Rise’, 
Africans bearing in mind that no one except themselves will emancipate themselves from 
poverty and underdevelopment should understand what China’s interests are and how they 
can manage them without losing out.  
 
China’s role in FOCAC 
 
FOCAC is a multilateral cooperation institution with various stakeholders from the both the 
African and Chinese sides. China has 27 member agencies whereas African states have more 
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than 5 levels of institutions participating in policy-making and implementation89. The 
following are the key agencies and their responsibilities from the Chinese side:   
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages FOCAC and the overall policy and implementation. 
Political affairs at FOCAC are spearheaded by this ministry, therefore Chinese embassies and 
consulates throughout Africa play a central role in the functioning of this ministry90.  
The Ministry of Commerce handles issues related to trade, investment and training within the 
FOCAC framework91. Wang Cheng’and noted that the ministry plays an important role in 
planning and implementing economic and aid projects, including facilitating public bidding 
by Chinese companies on aid projects, making policy to support Chinese companies in 
enhancing trade and investment in Africa, and taking charge of aid projects, such as building 
schools, hospitals, anti-malaria centres and agricultural demonstration centres and training 
African professionals92. In addition, the ministry also serves as an important link between the 
Chinese Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office in Africa and African governments.  
The Ministry of Finance is crucial in financing the activities within the FOCAC framework. 
Budgetary issues and supervision of FOCAC’s activities are closely monitored by the 
ministry.  
The FOCAC Follow –up Action Committee plays a central role in coordinating all the 27 
agencies from the Chinese side. The committee is led by the Chinese State Council and 
operates per the Chinese national system93.The follow-up committee is open to other 
government ministries with the Chinese government.  
The structures mentioned above are the core agencies central to the functioning of FOCAC 
from the Chinese side. In addition to the latter, several Chinese financial institutions have 
been involved in the running of the framework. These include the Export-Import Bank of 
China (EXIM Bank) which is at the forefront of construction projects and selective 
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investments. The China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) is a leading institution in 
funding agriculture projects, infrastructure and manufacturing. The China Developing Bank 
plays important special loans to Africa’s small and medium enterprises.  Shelton, Funeka, 
April, and Anshan in their comprehensive book on FOCAC illustrated the importance of 
Chinese financial institutions by pointing out that the China Development Bank and Ex-Im 
Bank combined are currently providing more loans to Africa than World Bank94. These 
institutions are growing in popularity in most African states against the backdrop of heavy 
criticism of the World Bank’s predatory lending policies towards African states.  
Other Chinese agencies involved in the FOCAC framework are as follows: 
Information Office of the State Council, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of 
Science and Technology, Ministry of Land and Resources, National Development and 
Reform Commission, International Department of CPC Central Committee, Ministry of 
Transport, Ministry of Industry and Information, Bank of China People‘s Bank of China, 
National Tourism Administration, State Administration of Taxation, General  Administration 
of Customs, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade, Chinese Communist Youth League and Beijing Municipal Government.  
One can argue that the Chinese side of the FOCAC framework is well organised and shows 
great commitment to Sino-Africa relations. The successes of the FOCAC framework is 
therefore not a miracle but expected outcomes given the hard work that they have been doing.  
 
Africa’s role in FOCAC 
 
The African side of the FOCAC framework is relatively smaller as compared to the Chinese 
counterpart. Unlike the Chinese counterparts, the African side lacks a clear and centralised 
front. Other than the lack of clear leadership from the African sub-regional and regional 
organisations, the lack of centralised and unified front is largely due to the nature of an Africa 
with 54 countries. The African Diplomatic Corps is one of the most important structures due 
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to continuous access to the Chinese Follow- up Committee.  African governments involved in 
the FOCAC framework have representatives at the African Diplomatic Corps thereby 
allowing information and decision to trickle down to respective governments.    
Senior government officials from individual African countries play a prominent role in 
liaising their respective governments with the FOCAC framework. In 2005, the first Chinese 
– Africa Senior Office (SOM) meeting was held in Beijing95. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of different African states are also crucial stakeholders in the FOCAC framework. Issues 
regarding political issues are discussed for the purposes of reaching common positions in 
global multilateral organisations, particularly within the UN.  Issues relating to climate 
change and sustainable development goals (SDGs) have previously been on agendas between 
respective African Ministry of Foreign Affairs and FOCAC.  
The African Union (AU) the foremost institution in African development is a late comer to 
FOCAC. The continental organisation previously used to get involved in FOCAC involved 
with observer status but as of FOCAC VI in Johannesburg, it became a fully participating 
member. NEPAD serves as the AU’s technical arm in mobilising political will and giving 
suggestions within the FOCAC institution. For example, the FOCAC Action Plan (2007-
2009) indicated the importance of AU, sub-regional and regional financial institutions. It 
noted that cooperation between FOCAC and NEPAD was essential for the advancement of 
Africa’s regional integration96. The AU in 2011 received $ 4 million for the purposes of 
organising training workshops for AU officials on crucial topics such as public governance, 
diplomacy, terrorism and poverty reduction97. Countries like Ethiopia and South Africa have 
over the years managed to establish their own follow-up institutions which have played 
important roles in accessing their respective state's progress.  
 
From FOCAC I to FOCAC VI 
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Different reasons have been brought forward to why FOCAC was established. Taylor argues 
that Beijing after being isolated the West realised that in the post-Tiananmen era, allies and 
sympathisers could be won over using aid98. Foreign Minister Quan Qichen tour of 14 
African states between June 1989 and June 1992 is portrayed by Taylor as desperate attempt 
to win over African States alliance. This narrative is flawed because historically since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China, there has been a high-level exchange between 
African states and China. Anshan pointed to China’s own sensitivity over the Western 
competition in Africa and the urgency of building a permanent cooperation mechanism 
prompted the Chinese government to accept the African suggestion to establish FOCAC.   
Regardless of the different speculated reasons to why FOCAC was established framework 
signalled a milestone in Sino- Africa relations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Information sourced from The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of Forum on 
China -Africa Cooperation99) 
FOCAC 1: Beijing  
The first FOCAC was held in October 2000 in Beijing.  On top of the agenda were two major 
areas namely; how to promote and establish a just and equitable new international order, and 
to further strengthen co-operation between China and Africa on social and economic 
development.  The Beijing Declaration and the Programme of Cooperation on Economic and 
Social Development were the two main policy documents formulated at the forum.  Debt 
cancellation provisions worth RMB 10 billion were signed. China also pledged to support 
African states with skills development through the provision of scholarships and training of 
                                                          
98 Ian Taylor, China in Africa, China’s Africa Policy in Historical Perspective, AISA.   
99 The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of Forum on China -Africa Cooperation.  
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experts.   
FOCAC 2: Addis Ababa 
The second Forum was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15-16 December 2003. The 
main agenda of the meeting was to review the implementation of the two policy documents 
formulated in Beijing. The Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) was adopted with plans to 
increase cooperation on political and international issues. For the first time, African and 
Chinese business interested parties converged through the China –Africa Business 
Conference.  Important agreements were reached concerning trade and diplomatic relations. 
China agreed to a traffic free entrance of African goods in China. The African Human 
Resources Development Fund was set up with aims of training young Africans, particularly 
in scarce skills sectors.  Cultural exchange was high on the agenda resulting in the China-
Africa Youth Carnival and Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa being agreed to for the sake 
of better people to people diplomacy. 
FOCAC 3: Strategic Partnership in Beijing  
The government of China released its White Paper on ‘China’s African Policy' in 2006. This 
was an important step towards China officially formulating its own policy guidelines in its 
endeavours with Africa. President Jintao while visiting Nigeria in April 2006 ushered in the 
concept of ‘a new strategic partnership’. One can argue that the Sino- Africa relations were 
upgraded by this announcement.  Central to this strategic partnership was the consolidation of 
African and Chinese interests in political, economic, cultural and security fields and 
international affairs. Out of the strategic partnership, China- Africa relations were expected to 
have characteristics of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and win-win 
basis.  The 3rd FOCAC was held in Beijing from 3rd to 5th of December. $ US 5 billion of 
concessionary loans were offered to African states. In addition, a China-Africa Development 
Fund was established to support Chinese investments in Africa.   
The 4th FOCAC was held in Egypt, Sharm el-Sheikh on the 8th to 9th of November 2009. 
The meeting reviewed the commitments made at the 3rd Beijing forum.  At the 4th forum, the 
FOCAC 4: Sharm el- Sheikh  
Sharm el-Sheikh declaration was established with an action plan for 2010 to 2012. Other than 
the occasional rolling out of interest-free loans, China committed to providing $1 billion for 
African small and medium-sized businesses. The meeting was highlighted by Beijing’s 
52 | P a g e  
 
commitment to building clean and renewable energy on the African continent.  China pledged 
to train 20 000 professionals in various fields, particularly scarce skills sector for the next 3 
years. 
FOCAC 5: Beijing  
The 5th FOCAC was hosted by China in Beijing on the 19th and 20th of July,2012.  Two 
major African concerns were stressed at the forum. African desires to meet the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the development of an African Standby 
Force. Beijing committed to assisting Africa with the two. In addition, $ 20 billion in open 
credit lines were opened for Africa. The traditional scholarships, training of professionals and 
people to people exchanges were high on the agenda.     
FOCAC 6: Johannesburg  
The 6th FOCAC was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. The relationship between China and 
Africa was upgraded to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’. The Johannesburg Action 
Plan consisted of 10-point cooperation plus which include employment, food, clothing and 
healthcare amongst other things.  China took the occasion to launch its second paper on 
China-Africa foreign policy. US$60 billion was pledged to FOCAC work particularly 
infrastructure development.    
 
President Xi Jinping reemphasized China’s commitment to the strategic partnership in his 
widely published book ‘The Governance of China’, by stating that,  
‘China will continue to expand investment and financing cooperation with Africa, follow 
through on the commitment of providing a $20 billion credit line to Africa from 2013 to 
2015, implement the partnership on transnational and trans-regional infrastructure 
development, enhance mutually beneficial cooperation in agriculture and manufacturing, and 
help Africa exploit its wealth of resources, and achieve independent and sustainable 
development100’ 
The Sino-Africa economics activities with the guidance of FOCAC framework have 
stimulated and attracted other actors that traditionally did not have interests in Africa. Middle 
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Eastern and Asian countries that previously paid little attention to African states have 
recently increased their presence on the continent. Africans now have the luxury of having 
options on who to relate with. Traditionally former British colonies looked to 10 Downing 
Street for technical assistance as well as for trade; former French colonies looked to Paris for 
political and trade relations however the advent of a fast-developing China has given African 
states alternatives.  
 
FOCAC Achievements 
 
FOCAC has achieved success in cross-sector areas ranging from peace and security to 
cultural exchanges. China is well known for its heavy investment in African large scale 
infrastructure. FOCAC’s main achievements are therefore visible and tangible like the 
opening of the new railway route from Addis Ababa to the Red Sea port city of Djibouti to 
the Mombasa –Nairobi Railway in Kenya. China has been credited for meeting its targets and 
promises within the FOCAC framework and in most cases exceeding its promises. FOCAC 
achievements have impacted Africa positively and ought to be celebrated.  
  Regional Integration and Infrastructure Development  
 
Infrastructure development is the key that unlocks the bottlenecks of underdevelopment on 
the African continent. Abuka explains that “problems with roads, railways, ports, air 
transport, energy, telecommunications and other infrastructure” hinders economic growth and 
development in Africa101. One of China’s earliest infrastructure development projects on the 
African continent was the construction of the TAZARA railway aimed at linking up the 
landlocked Zambia to the Tanzanian Dar es Salaam port. Beijing’s spirit of building grant 
infrastructure still exists and remains its hallmark as far as developmental assistance is 
concerned. The number of successful infrastructure projects that China has developed on the 
continent is countless. It is important to note that China does not only sponsor hard 
infrastructure projects but has also contributed heavily in Africa’s Information and 
Communication Industry. Chinese companies like Huawei Technologies and   ZTE 
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(Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation) are active in more than 50 African 
countries thereby literally connecting Africa102.  
At the last FOCAC VI, China pledged to provide Africa with $35 billion, aimed at supporting 
the construction of more than 400 projects in African countries103. The latter buttresses 
China’s commitment to developing African infrastructure. The African Union Agenda 2063 
aims to have an industrialised Africa in the next three decades. As a symbol of solidarity, 
China built the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa worth over $ 200 million104. 
All FOCAC Action Plans since 2004 have placed an emphasis on regional integration 
advancement through infrastructure development105.  The FOCAC, Addis Ababa Action Plan 
(2004-2006) specified support for infrastructure projects to improve transport for landlocked 
African countries and encourage Chinese enterprise to undertake infrastructure development. 
FOCAC, Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) raised the importance of regional organisations, 
particularly the AU, regional and sub-regional financial organisations106. In FOCAC, Sharm 
el-Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), again Beijing recommitted its support for regional 
organisations placing an emphasis on capacity building107. The 5th FOCAC prioritised the AU 
and its organ institutions. The Beijing Declaration of 2012 states that China through FOCAC, 
“Strengthen cooperation with the AU and sub -regional organisations, take joint measures to 
promote African solidarity, harmony and strength through unity and support measures for 
African regional integration and sustainable development efforts through the AU/NEPAD 
mechanisms108” 
Over 14 regional bodies exist on the African continent, of which 8 are officially recognised 
by the AU.  These are SADC, COMESA, CEN-SAD, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, AMU and 
EAC.  The 8 recognised AU regional bodies have received support from FOCAC that trickles 
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down through the AU’s organ institutions like NEPAD, APRM and Pan -African Parliament. 
Studies have shown that overlapping membership, lack of infrastructure, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and lack of financial resources to implement mandates are some of the core factors 
hindering regional integration. African states role in FOCAC has been characterised as 
having no clear mandate and direction something that the AU as the foremost regional 
organisation can use to marshal all the regional organisations that it officially recognises to 
have policies and action plans that emulate AU’s development agenda’s. In that way, Africa 
can have a solid front when engaging China while at the same time advancing its regional 
cooperation.  
 
  Human Capital Development  
 
Human resources form part of the fundamental backbone of a functioning state and continent. 
As AU embarks on its Agenda 2063 developmental plan it needs to prioritise human capital 
development as a prerequisite for sustainable growth. Investments in health and education 
have been hailed as the foremost sectors in human capital development. Ashan and April 
argue that that empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability and security are critical 
components of human capital development.  
African governments are under a lot of pressure to address the lack of human resource 
development on the continent. The lack of well-trained public servants has contributed 
significantly to poor service delivery thus delaying developmental aspirations of African 
people. China through the FOCAC framework established the   African Human Resources 
Development Fund in 2000. The fund has grown significantly covering the costs of funding 
10,000 personnel in various fields from 2004 to 2006. China -Africa Joint Research and 
Exchange Program was launched in 2010, it conducts more than 100 cooperation programs 
and sponsored academic exchanges involving more than 1000 Chinese and African scholars.     
Education plays an important role in the development and sending African students abroad to 
get skills is necessary for the achievement of Agenda 2063. In 2009, various personal were 
trained in China ranging from 1,500 principals and teachers and agricultural experts. The 
launch of China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership in 2009 and sponsoring of over 
100 African post-doctoral fellows showed Beijing’s commitment to human capital 
development. In 2013, more than 33 000 African students were studying in China with 7300 
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having received Chinese government scholarships. 26 000 students were self-sponsoring 
indicating an increase of African students choosing China over Europe where most African 
scholars generally get educated. This development is positive because Africans can be vested 
with educations from different regions of the world.  
Judging from the first FOCAC 1 to FOCAC VI, one can argue the number of scholarship and 
resources made available for education have exponentially increased.  The commitment to the 
development of African human resource is overwhelming. The latter is rooted in China’s 
belief that only Africans themselves have the keys to unlock shackles of underdevelopment. 
This maxim of self-help is necessary for Africa to speed up its development pace.  
The Ebola crisis assistance that African states were given by China during the August 2014 
speaks to Chinese rhetoric of an ‘all weather friendship’. The Secretariat of the Chinese 
Follow–up Committee of the FOCAC notes that the Chinese government took the lead in 
providing the largest medical aid overseas in history, spearheading the international 
community’s efforts to help African countries fight Ebola epidemic and showcasing the 
profound friendship between China and Africa109.  Since 2000, Beijing has dispatched 7,600 
medical professionals to African countries and built 68 hospitals. The Brightness Action 
campaign is a flagship campaign that has received admiration in the 42 African countries it is 
currently involved in110. Elderly African citizens have been receiving the gift of sight through 
free cataract surgeries provided by Chinese doctors. Initiatives aimed at supporting Africa 
health care systems keep African health systems afloat. The reduction of funding through 
neo-liberal policies has resulted in basic services like health care being privatised resulting in 
unnecessary loss of human life. Provisions within the FOCAC framework to aid the health 
care systems of African states, therefore, go a long way in saving human life.   
 
Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security 
 
Xuejun argues that China has advocated for Africa at the UN Security Council and remains 
the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the UNSC, 
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with more than 3000 peacekeepers involved in 16 peacekeeping missions in Africa111.  After 
the escalation of Somali Pirates in the Gulf of Aden, China has constantly protected the 
waters resulting in protection of ships crossing the troubled waters from 2009 to April 2015.  
Over 6000 foreign ships have been escorted by the Chinese navy thereby making the Gulf of 
Aden a safer shipping route. The AU’s goal of silencing guns and realising a conflict-free 
Africa by 2030 as enshrined in Vision 2020 can be achieved through close partnership with 
China through the FOCAC framework112.  
Chinese aid within the FOCAC framework will be paramount in realising the full operation 
of the African Standby Force urgently needed to deal with conflict on the African continent.  
At the Johannesburg FOCAC VI, Beijing will provide $100 million to support the 
establishment of the long-awaited African Standby Force and African Capacity for 
Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), South Africa’s recent initiative within the AU113. 
Key contributes include the launch of the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership 
for Peace and Security at the Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC for the enhancement of 
peace and security issues. China has previously deployed peacekeepers and election 
observers in Mali, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. The contributions of China to African 
peace and security have been outstanding and have room for improvement. China can, for 
example, assist in the goal of silencing guns. The rise of extremists groups in the Sahel and 
Horn of Africa is are potential areas of cooperation.  
China’s commitment to non-interference in African domestic politics has resulted in little 
attention being paid to governance issues. APRM a good governance institution that 
promotes democracy has received little support from China since its launch. FOCAC remains 
a platform for African states to collaborate with China in ways of maintaining global peace 
and security.  
 
Agriculture and Environment 
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Given the realities of climate change, African countries are regularly affected by drought and 
floods resulting in food security being threatened. To date, China has dispatched over 20, 000 
agricultural experts114. Moreover, more than 55,000 scholarships for programmes in China 
and training for special skills have been provided to Africans particularly the youth115.  Africa 
has vast agricultural land that can feed its people and cater for external demands if managed 
and maintained properly. The growing Chinese middle class will also depend heavily on 
African produce thereby creating jobs and opportunities for Africans.  
China has 6% of world's fresh water and 9% of world’s arable land nut manages to feed 20% 
of world’s population. Africa has more arable land than China but can barely feed its 
population.  Africans should seize the opportunity presented by the Chinese government’s 
zero -tariff policy for certain African products. The Chinese government has encouraged 
agricultural businesses to invest in African countries like Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, and 
Malawi and a result, local food crops and cash crops have seen significant boosts increasing 
local employment and foreign exchange revenue. African agricultural exports to China 
particularly sesame, hemp, silk, cotton and oil seeds demanded by the Chinese booming 
middle class should be increased for the African agricultural sector to become competitive on 
international markets.  
Concerns have been raised about China’s contribution to continued African environmental 
degradation. These concerns are warranted given China’s own issues with pollution at home. 
China’s is the second largest oil consumer and the world’s largest importer of tropical wood. 
Criticism of China’s operations in Africa have largely been from the western government, 
companies, financial institutions and intergovernmental organisations.  Adjustments have 
been made by Chinese companies to comply with local rules and regulations. On behalf of 
the Chinese government, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) currently supervises more than 150 companies involved in natural 
resources extraction, including Sinopec, CNOOC and CNPC.  
China’s own domestic strict rules have resulted in companies emulating home guideline in 
their foreign missions.  The commitment to clean energy illustrated by the increase in Hydro 
Dams and Solar plants show that China is evolving its record in environment protection 
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policies. African states have the obligation to protect their environments, therefore, they 
should bargain for strict rules of engagement when Chinese companies. FOCAC is the right 
platform to push these bargains collectively.  
 
Private Sector 
 
FOCAC achieved remarkable strides in driving economic growth on the African continent.  
In 2004, the volume of China-Africa trade skyrocketed to $US 222 billion, 21 times that of 
2000. Special economic and trade cooperation zones have been built in Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Zambia and Nigeria. One can argue that China is creating other ‘Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zones’ on the continent. The government of China has also increasingly supported Chinese 
companies investing in Africa. 
 Least developed countries with diplomatic ties with China are afforded a zero tariff to 97 
percent of their exports to China.   Angola is one of Africa’s fasted growing economies; its 
economic performance must be credited to Chinese investments concentrated in this oil 
producing country. FOCAC trade and investment practices have challenged orthodox 
practices thereby producing wonders like making post-civil war states like Angola and 
Mozambique some of the best performing states in the world.  The Johannesburg Action Plan 
and Johannesburg Declaration adopted at the FOCAC Johannesburg Summit indicate the 
need for increased trade and investment.   
African countries have responded to China’s new investment capacity with incentives to 
attract capital. China has strengthened this trend with new investments in Africa, for example, 
in South Africa in October 2007, China’s largest bank, the state-owned Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) bought a 20 percent stake in Standard Bank for $ 5.5 
billion. This was the largest single FDI transaction in South Africa’s history and set the stage 
for increased Chinese FDI flows to the African continent. Given that technology transfers, 
skills transfer and job creation usually accompany FDI, Africa can work towards increasing 
Chinese capital flows.  
FOCAC must be credited for FDI’s coming from China. FDI’s come with technology 
transfer, skills transfer, job creation and capital flows that African states urgently need. In 
2014, the stock of China’s non-financial direct investment in Africa had totalled over $ 30 
billion, more than 60 times the amount in 2000. Tencent, one of China’s top Internet 
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companies currently holds $66 billion worth of shares in South Africa’s MIG. The increase in 
investments in African private sector is paramount for job creation and skills development a 
necessity in African markets.  
As labour costs increase in China, companies are looking to relocate. African states are 
burdened by high levels unemployment and slow economic growth. The creation of Industrial 
Zones by Chinese companies in Ethiopia such as the Eastern Industry Zone, China-Egypt 
Suez Economic Cooperation Zone, Zambia- China Economic & Trade Zone should be 
emulated for African industries to get meaningful boosts and increase production capacity. 
The Two Centenary Goal and Silk Road development strategies should be used by African 
countries to leverage more private sector contributions from China. Currently, government to 
government cooperation and investments dominate the relationship a characteristic that can 
change given mutual efforts from both sides.  
 
Social and Cultural Development 
 
In promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges initiatives like the China –Africa 
Cultural Cooperation Partnership and Exchange Plan and China –Africa People-to-People 
Friendship Action has resulted in increased exchanges between African and Chinese people. 
In addition, more than 46 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms have been 
established in Africa116. The first Confucius Institute in Africa was opened at the University 
of Nairobi in 2015. In April 2015, South Africa become the first African government to 
introduce Mandrin as a second additional language. The spreading of Mandrin is a good 
example of how China aims to assert its soft power in Africa. Having African speak Mandrin 
makes it easy for Africans to understand the Chinese better as well as improve people to 
people relations.  
African tourist destinations have increasingly become a popular destination for Chinese 
travellers. Contact between Chinese and African people is crucial in boosting African 
business as well dismissing stereotypes developed due to lack of contact.  It is important for 
the FOCAC framework to let the relationship between African people and Chinese people 
reach the grassroots of both Chinese and African people. To date, Chinese cultural centres 
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have been set up in Mauritius, Benin, Egypt, Nigeria and Tanzania. FOCAC should prioritise 
exposing Chinese people to African cultures for more mutual learning to be facilitated.  
Woman empowerment is central to all-inclusive development on the African continent, given 
the history of marginalisation of an African woman.  Discourse on China-Africa relations has 
been slacking in promoting woman empowerment particularly a woman as decision makers.  
The current 2016-2018 Johannesburg Action Plan has three commitments to woman and 
children empowerment. These are gender equity, employment and self -development and 
poverty reduction. The education of girls should take centre stage in these commitments and 
contributions but unfortunately, minimum efforts have been taken an issue that FOCAC 
should resolve urgently. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed China’s contribution to the FOCAC framework. The institutional 
set up of FOCAC has been explained giving detailed information of what role China plays in 
FOCAC.  Six thematic areas were covered in summing up Beijing’s contribution to African 
development. Since the establishment of a formalised institution, China’s foreign policy 
towards Africa is fully developed given that two foreign policy papers have been published, 
one in 2006 and the most recent in 2015 at the Johannesburg Summit.  
Regrettably, African states remain unorganised and lack serious policy understanding of their 
interest in Sino-Africa relations. Reverting to SDGs and Agenda 2063 policy documents that 
have been used to relate to most external partners is not helpful. Africa needs a China paper 
that will guide the African Union and sub-regional organisations in engaging and managing 
Beijing, particularly at institutions of bargaining like FOCAC. The Africa developmental 
agenda also needs to prioritise the FOCAC framework by building common positions through 
agreed policies at sub-regional and regional institutions with the end goal of harmonising all 
African states towards a sustainable relationship with Beijing.  
The length of each thematic area reporting and analysis speaks volumes to the degree of 
contribution. China does well in huge infrastructure development projects. Hard 
infrastructure like railway, roads, airport, ports and dam constructions throughout Africa have 
been given a facelift since increased relations with China. Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya for 
example now have fast-speed trains through their cooperation with China. Areas of 
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environment protection and empowerment remain a glitch in Sino- Africa relations. Little has 
been done and surely the relations can further be strengthened through better cooperation.  
The Sino- Africa relations given all the documents analysed increasingly push for mutual and 
win-win relations. Africa is winning through increased investments in infrastructure 
development and access to lines of credit and loans.    African states have failed to take the 
opportunity of having Beijing on one table as a perfect advantage for collective bargaining. 
Due to the weakness of the African camp, Beijing has been dominating the FOCAC 
framework. The AU, for example, was only admitted as an organising institution in 2011 
having been occupying observer status since the inception of FOCAC. This means the 
African block primary responsibility for development, peace and integration aspiration of 
African people was not a formal structure of FOCAC and had no say on the FOCAC agenda. 
Nonetheless, given its 17 years’ history, the organisation has made strides in many aspects 
and promises to bring better relations between China and African states.  
This chapter has illustrated that soft power is important for states that are developing like 
China. As they look for new markets and new allies they need to attract other states to their 
policies. China’s non-interference policy means that it can gradually build up its soft power 
arsenal without clashing with the West and other traditional powers with interests on the 
African continent. Through the spreading of Mandrin, for example, China is slowly but surely 
co-opting Africans into their Chinese ways of life which make it easy for trade and people to 
people relations. Critics have labelled it neo-colonialism however with African governments 
free to make their own choices, it is difficult to blame China of imperial dominance on the 
African continent.  
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Chapter 4: Japan in Africa: An analysis of TICAD in African Development.  
 
Introduction 
  
This chapter will focus on Japan- Africa relations while paying to emphasise on the TICAD 
framework. The main purpose of this chapter is to take a balance sheet approach is accessing 
Japan’s contributions to African development.  A historical outlook will be given to see how 
Japan foreign policy has evolved from Post WW2, The Cold War and its trajectories after the 
launch of TICAD in 1993. Through tracing the outcomes of TICAD events and MoFA’s 
contributions through JICA, one can identify the overall contribution of TICAD towards the 
African Union’s developmental agenda.  
This chapter will argue that Japan-Africa relations remain weak while still only limited to 
business. The chapter will argue that traditional Japanese soft power in Africa is waning. The 
historical aspect of Japan not supporting liberation struggle movements and in South Africa 
being aligned with the apartheid regime is one factor. The rise of China in African business 
landscape has also affected Japan-China relations. Nonetheless, through TICAD, Japan -
Africa relations have been improved. The AU and its agencies have taken central space in the 
TICAD process something that ought to be celebrated.  
Six thematic areas consisting of as (1) Private Sector (2) Human Capital Development (3) 
Governance, Democracy, Peace and Security (4) Agriculture and Environment (5) Regional 
Integration and Infrastructure (Transport, Energy and Communication) and (6) Social and 
Cultural Development (Youth and Woman); These will be discussed while identifying 
Japan’s role in advancing African developmental goals. The end goal is to identify how the 
TICAD process works and understanding Japan’s role in African development. 
This chapter will be guided by Joseph Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power. Although Nye 
coined the term, other scholars have built on it through the support of the framework and 
outright criticism. For instance, some thinkers argue that soft power is effective and, it 
sometimes reinforces or interferes with hard power, but in most cases, soft power does not 
depend on hard power. Nye’s improved definition defines soft power as the ability to affect 
others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive 
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attraction for the purposes of obtaining preferred outcomes117. This chapter will argue that 
Japan’s foreign policy for Africa is built upon the foundation of soft power, however, China’s 
increased presence has resulted in its subsequent decline.  
Japan -Africa Relations: Historical Background 
  
The TICAD framework was launched in 1993 as a platform for the Japanese government to 
extend its foreign policy towards African states through cooperation with the United Nations, 
World Bank, and the UN Development Programme. The primary objective was to help 
develop Africa and promote peace and security. International relations experts also argue that 
the establishment of TICAD was an attempt by Japan to find relevance on the African 
continent after years of neglect and in some instances, support for colonial powers. TICAD 
summits were hosted every five years in Tokyo however for the first time TICAD VI was 
hosted in Kenya. At the TICAD VI in August 2016, both Japan and African leaders agreed to 
meet after 3 years.  
Traditionally, Africa did not hold a special place in Japanese foreign relations. South Africa 
is an exception, having granted the Japanese community special privilege of being ‘Honorary 
Whites’ in the 1930s and the duration of apartheid. Japan has traditionally seen Africa as a 
European backyard, therefore, resulting in Tokyo directing its efforts to trade with minimum 
political interference118. Egypt and South Africa were the pioneering African countries to 
establish close trade ties with Japan. In the 1930s disparities emerged between Japan and 
European states as result of Japans decision to switch wool exports from Australia to South 
Africa.  
The colonial mentality, heavily influenced by ‘scientific racist’ ideas of the early 20th century 
which were widespread among white people were exported to Japan. Japan’s views of 
Africans were in no way different from the backwards and uncivilised perceptions held by 
Europeans colonisers. Japan was generally hostile towards liberation struggle movements 
during the wave of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Anti-colonial movements 
received no support, for example in 1982 the African National Congress (ANC) was 
described by MoFa as a terrorist organisation119. The latter was a betrayal of the Afro-Asia 
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Conference of 1955 commonly known as the Bandung Conference. Japan’s alliance with the 
USA and lack of support for the African liberation cause be viewed as a divergence from the 
Bandung Spirit.  
In the 1960s, industrialisation was picked up the pace in Japan after successful initiatives by 
the Ministry of Internal Trade and Industry (MITI)120. Both MITI and MoFA increased their 
efforts towards Africa relations resulting in close relations with Zaire (now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo). Zaire was strategic to Tokyo due to its possession of cobalt a mineral 
central to Japan’s high-tech industries. Japan’s fast industrialisation, hailed the 
‘developmental state is popular subject is development studies.  It is celebrated on the 
African continent because it is a living example that a war wretched state can rise from its 
poverty and become a leading global powerhouse. It is no surprise that the ‘developmental 
state’ thesis is still something that African states aim to emulate as part of their drive towards 
industrialisation.   
The 1970s saw Japan extend its foreign policy initiatives to Uganda. Japan, found it 
challenging to trade with Francophone parts of Africa. In addition, the 1970s oil shocks 
further heightened Japan’s interests on the Africa continent. Realpolitik swayed Japan to 
reconsider its Africa policy to one that is more engaging given the vast natural resources 
Africa possess. A short supply of natural resources given Japan’s momentum towards 
industrialisation would be catastrophic. Japan’s foreign policy initiatives in the 1970s are 
viewed as moves to contain European domination on the African continent.  
 
Phases in Japan -Africa relations  
 
Japan- Africa relations if properly analysed show five distinct phases. These phases are part 
and parcel of what most analysts argue to be Japan’s reactive foreign policy towards African 
states. Pre-1990s were generally marked by poor engagement and little attention paid to 
African issues. As earlier mentioned, South Africa was the exception with some political and 
economic ties dating back as far as the early 1930s.  
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The first phase, between 1954 and 1973 witnessed Tokyo increasingly preoccupied with 
Asian issues121. Japan gave negligible foreign assistance to Africa as it efforts were focused 
on Asian matters where to some extent it led as a regional power.    
1974-80 marked Japan’s second phase primarily influenced by commodity price shocks. Oil 
prices skyrocketed and Japan was forced to pay closer attention to African states primarily oil 
producing countries122. Bilateral aid was a choice of engagement as Japan expanded her 
interests from not only oil but also strategic minerals.  
The years between 1980 and 1988 period witnessed a heightened Japanese interest in Africa. 
One can argue that this phase was instrumental to the pioneering of TICAD. Sato argues that 
Japanese aid during this period characterised as “becoming more globalised and expanded in 
absolute terms.”123 The good economic performance in the 1980s placed it under 
international pressure to give aid against the backdrop of increases in its trade surplus. Africa 
became the biggest beneficiary receiving up to 15% of Japanese ODA.  
The fourth phase, between 1989 and 2000 saw Japan become a top global aid donor. Japan 
established the TICAD conference diplomacy in 1993, pioneering a wave of interests in 
African development and peace and security post- Cold War. Japan unprecedently started 
engaging African states multilaterally and showed a willingness to support developmental 
projects as well as peace and security initiatives.  
The current phase, the fifth one, started in 2001. Japan has been reforming its aid diplomacy 
due to international developments. China is indeed a factor in the changes. Japan has been on 
the forefront of reforming the ODA system through the adoption of the ODA Charter 
amongst other things. In addition, Japan has been encouraging African countries to support 
NEPAD and APRM. Agenda 2063 and SDGs have been on the forefront of Japan’s 
dispersion of its aid regime.  
In 2008, Japan established the Japan International Cooperation Agency with the support of its 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Prime Minister Abe can, therefore, be 
credited for the emergence of a more stable Japan- Africa foreign policy. This is against the 
backdrop of Japanese engagement being ‘reactive’ towards Africa. The current engagement is 
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the theme of “true partnership”.  There is a wave of the language of “beneficiation” in 
Japan’s approach; this is encouraging given African’s need to own its development process.  
 
Why TICAD?  
 
The wave of decolonization swept past Africa with most African states independent as of 
1990. The launch of TICAD in 1993 can be viewed as a strategic move by Japan to reshape 
its Japan-Africa policy. Japan decided to become an altruist donor of aid to Africa124. In my 
view, this was a desperate attempt to improve its image and recover from bad relations given 
the history of Tokyo’s close relationship with racist and colonialist regimes. The interest of 
African states voting in favour of Japan attaining a seat on the UN Security Council and 
countering China’s re-emerge are examples of Tokyo’s interests on the continent.  TICAD 
started before FOCAC and since the advent of FOCAC, it has distinguished itself, mainly 
focusing on human rights and anti-corruption activities.  
Mensah argues that Japan’s development cooperation with Africa have been informed to 
some extent by its membership of the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC), the country has 
developed its own unique approach to advance its economic interests and take advantage of 
the economic opportunities afforded by Africa’s incorporation into the global market125. 
Japan has a fast developing neighbour whose economic growth and military strength has 
burgeoned in the last two decades. China is on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
while Japan relies on its strategic allies, the EU and USA for support when it comes to global 
political issues. Japan has been seeking UNSC without significant backing from the African 
block. China’s ascendancy to the UNSC relied heavily on the African block’s voting 
constituency. In my analysis, Japan seeks to emulate China’s example of getting a seat on the 
prestigious UN body through support from the African block. TICAD’s work can, therefore, 
be an instrument in appeasing African states to support Japan’s interests.  
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Organisations central to TICAD  
 
The Government of Japan, The African Union Commission (AUC), The World Bank, The 
Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSSA) and The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) are the five co-organisers of TICAD. The following is a brief 
description of the role each of the co-organisers play at the TICAD:  
Government of Japan  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA)  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan is the leading organiser of TICAD. The Information 
on the Foreign Minister, State Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Parliamentary Vice-
Ministers for Foreign Affairs are some of the instrumental offices from the Japan government 
that plan and coordinate with Japan’s embassies, consulates and permanent missions in 
African states to organise TICAD.126MoFA coordinates with the Ministry of Finance and 
agencies like JICA, UNDP, Japan Bank International Cooperation for African Investment 
(JBIC). The ministry is, therefore, a focal point for the running of TICAD.  
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)  
 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established in 2003 by the Japanese 
government as a tool to aid the government's international cooperation, boost global 
economic development, and bring stability in developing regions. Since its inception, JICA 
participates at TICAD conferences through hosting side events with public and private 
sectors, civil society and academia. Through JICA, the Japanese government can dispatch 
experts in different sectors particularly, health and education to train and assist African states. 
JICA is essentially Japan’s agents on the ground in touch with the realities of African 
development.  As of 2014, JICA had 29 country offices on the African continent127. These 
include offices in countries affected by war like South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo. They, therefore, play a crucial role in pinpointing the real challenges and 
opportunities that TICAD can work with.  
The African Union Commission (AUC)  
 
The Commission is responsible for executive functions with the following portfolios: Peace 
and Security; Political Affairs; Trade and Industry; Infrastructure and Energy; Social Affairs; 
Rural Economy and Agriculture; Human Resources; Science and Technology; and Economic 
Affairs. The Mission of the AUC at the TICAD reads, “An efficient and value-adding 
institution driving the African integration and development process in close collaboration 
with the African Union States, the Regional Economic Communities and African citizens”128. 
Based on its mandate and responsibilities the AUC is the chief presentative of the African 
continent and its people at the TICAD.  The AUC was on the forefront of the hosting of 
follow-up meetings by the TICAD Follow-Up in Botswana, 2010 in Tanzania, 2011 in 
Senegal, 2012 in Morocco and 2014 in Cameroon.  
Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSSA) 
 
OSSA is tasked with engaging the private sector and civil society in the TICAD process. 
Currently, the organisation closely monitors the implementation of the Yokohama Action 
Plan 2013-2017 an outcome document of the TICAD V. In 2014, OSSA together with Japan, 
UNDP Bank and AUC organised the first ministerial meeting of the TICAD V in Yaoundé, 
Cameroon. OSSA has the mandate to follow on TICAD’s commitment to “Consolidating 
Peace, Stability, Democracy and Good Governance”. Japan’s contributions to the Sahel 
Region, for example, are results of OSSA follow up work within the TICAD framework.  
 
The Word Bank 
  
The World Bank has been a key sponsor of TICAD’s commitments to African development. 
For example, at the TICAD VI the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB and 
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Malaria (Global Fund) committed to invest $24 billion in Africa for the next three years129. 
The World Bank also brings external financial institutions and powerful organisations like the 
G5 to contribute substantially towards TICAD goals. 
 
United Nations Development Programme  
 
The UNDP goal in serving as a co-organizer of the TICAD is to accelerate sustainable human 
development in Africa130. Their partnership with TICAD has assisted in consolidating peace, 
advancement of democratic governance and bolster human security on the continent. They 
consult closely with civil society and public sector in finding ways of advancing socio-
economic development on the continent.  The United Nations has a lot of experience in the 
work that TICAD does, therefore their presence in the co-organising of TICAD brings value 
to the framework.  
 
Japan’s ODA policy 
 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) has in many ways become Tokyo's main 
foreign policy tool, utilised as a form of investment, a confidence-building measure, a 
solution for bilateral problems, a manifestation of economic power and global leadership, and 
as a tool for buying power and influence in various international organisations131. 
Japan adheres to international principles enshrined in the Paris Principles on Aid 
Effectiveness. TICAD’s work is therefore guided by ownership, alignment harmonisation, 
managing of results and mutual accountability which make the five pillars of OECD -DAC 
policy. UN programmes like the MDGs and now SDGs are part and parcel of the broader 
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goals that members of OECD and DAC aim to achieve when giving aid.  Governance issues 
have also been closely aligned to Japan’s developmental assistance dispensation. Considering 
the rise of non-traditional actors like China, India, Brazil, South Korea there has been a 
challenge to the policies that Japan adheres to.    
TICAD I to TICAD VI  
 
TICAD has diverse stakeholder that include developmental organisations, regional 
organisations, donor nations, the private sector and civil society organisations. Since it was 
established, the TICAD framework has hosted summit-level conferences every five years; 
however, as of TICAD VI in Nairobi, the conference will be hosted every three years. 
TICAD has evolved into a global framework that facilitates African development within the 
two decades of its existence. Since its inception, the themes of “ownership” and “partnership” 
have taken centre stage at the TICAD.  
The following extract is a compilation of statics gathered from the TICAD official website 
(https://ticad6.net/)  
TICAD I (1993): Tokyo 
 
The conference was a pioneering set up for conference diplomacy in African development in the era 
of post- Cold War.  Japan pledged 75 billion over the period of five years in financing African 
political and economic reforms132.The opening TICAD took priority in reversing the decline of 
development assistance for Africa following the end of the Cold War. It should be noted that the Cold 
War resulted in little attention being given to Africa development by external actors resulting in a 
sharp decline in foreign assistance. To a certain degree, foreign actors had “aid fatigue’. Participants 
at the TICAD 1 adopted the ‘Tokyo Declaration on African Development’. Amongst other things, the 
conference resulted in Japan and its co-organisers reaffirming political and economic reforms in 
Africa, boosting of private sector development, regional cooperation and development, and the 
harnessing of Asian experience for the benefits of African development. 
TICAD II (1998): Tokyo 
 
Poverty reduction was the highlight of the second TICAD conference. African development 
challenges, African regional integration, the participation of Africa in the global economy were the 
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highlights of the conference. TICAD II adopted the ‘Tokyo Agenda for Action’ which gave a holistic 
outline of the relationship that Japan and African states aimed to establish.  In addition, shared goals 
and objectives plus guidelines for actions to taken by Africa and its partners were adopted.  The theme 
of “ownership” which emphasised dual partnership between Africa and the international community 
was accepted as a point of departure by participants. These participants included 23 Head of states 
and government, 90 ministerial delegates, Cahir of AU Commission, 20 Heads of International and 
Regional Organisations. Japan pledged $ 1 billion over the next five years towards the African socio-
economic development133. Japan pledged 90 billion yen of grant aid, promised to build educational 
facilities for 2 million African children and improve living conditions of 15 million African134. 
  
TICAD III (2003): Tokyo  
 
The third conference was held in Tokyo, Japan on the 29th- 3rd of September 2003. It was attended by 
89 countries, 47 0rgnaisations and 1000 participants. The transformation of OAU into AU changed 
the agenda of TICAD III meeting. The newly established AU tasked NEPAD as the instrument for 
spearheading development on the African continent. AU decision to take a developmental route 
resulted in the third conference making clear indications that TICAD would support NEPAD. Japan’s 
support of NEPAD as a blueprint for peace and socio-economic growth and development was 
instrumental in boosting the newly established AU. In addition, it cancelled $ 3 billion to Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries and other eligible African states. The conference also marked the 10th 
anniversary since its inception in 1993. From the meeting, a 10th Anniversary Declaration document 
reemphasised the renewed commitment to African development and took priority with issues of 
human security. 
 
TICAD IV (2008): Yokohama 
 
The fourth conference was held in Yokohama, Japan from the 28th to 30th May 2008. The 
fourth TICAD was held against the backdrop of the popularisation of the UN MDGs. TICAD IV 
addressed three main areas: 1) Ensuring “human security and achievement of MDGs; 2) Boosting 
economic growth; 3) Addressing of environmental issues and climate change. TICAD IV was 
attended by 3000 delegates including 41 African heads of states. The latter showed overwhelming 
support of the framework by Africa people. Out of the conference, the Yokohama Action Plan was 
adopted, it outlined ways of following up on TICAD promises. The TICAD Follow- Up Mechanism 
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was introduced to track and monitor the implementation of the agreed targets. The inception of the 
TICAD Follow-Up Mechanism resulted in African leaders meeting annually for the TICAD 
Ministerial Follow- up meetings. 
   
TICAD V (2013): Yokohama 
 
The fifth conference was held in Yokohama, Japan from the 1st -3rd of June 2013. The conference was 
attended by 45000 participants which included 51 heads of states and government, 72 international 
and regional organisations, representatives from NGOs and Civil Society135. The event marked the 
20th anniversary of TICAD. Japan pledged 3.2 trillion yen in public-private initiatives and 1.4 trillion 
yen in official developmental assistance. The conference also included discussion on reform of the 
UN Security Council where Japan and Africa want urgent fair representation. On the African side, it 
marked the 50th anniversary of the OAU, the predecessor of the AU. The theme of the conference was 
“Hand in Hand with a more Dynamic Africa”, speaking of the initial ideas of ‘partnership’ and 
‘ownership’ that the TICAD framework adheres to. The agenda was based on three key areas: 1); 
Robust and Sustainable Economy 2; Inclusive and Resilient Society and 3); Peace and Security. 
  
TICAD VI (2016): Nairobi 
 
The TICAD VI was held on in Kenya, Nairobi for the first time since the establishment of TICAD. 32 
African heads of states, 18 000 participants including representatives of international and regional 
organisations. The conference was held under the theme ‘Advancing Africa’s Sustainable 
Development agenda: TICAD Partnership for Shared Prosperity’. On the agenda were 1); Promoting 
structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialisation 2); 
Promoting Resilient Health for Quality of life and 3); Promoting Social Stability for Shared 
Prosperity. Within the three themes covered at the conference, boosting of economic growth, 
acceleration of infrastructure and capacity development, empowering farmers, peace and security, 
inclusive growth and democracy and good government were some of the major topics covered. 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement for climate change took centre stage at 
the conference. The conference reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to Agenda 2063 and its First 10 Year 
Implementation Plan, NEPAD initiatives and regional integration.  
 
Thematic Areas 
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Peace and Security  
 
Peace and security have always been on TICAD’s agenda since its inception. For example, at 
the TICAD V in 2013, Japan allocated $ 26 million to support initiatives for stabilising the 
Sahel Region. The government of Japan further pledged $36 billion over 5 years towards 
African improvement of infrastructure, human resources development based on the Africa 
ownership and partnership ideas136.  Japan has been assisting in peacebuilding in Liberia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Mozambique. In addition, TICAD initiatives 
have given direct support to self-efforts of regional organisations of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Japan Self Defence Force (JSFD) is 
currently working with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of Sudan (UNMISS). The 
contributions to African preventative diplomacy and negotiation, nation building and 
peacebuilding is outstanding.    
 
Investment and Trade  
 
Japan’s has ownership and partnership with African states. Japan has various companies 
operating in Africa particularly in the motor industry. Toyota, for example, has some of its 
plants in South Africa thus contributing to creating and skills transfer. Credit has to be given 
to Japan for raising awareness about African investment and trade opportunities post- 1993 
after the international community has increasingly marginalised the continent. At the TICAD 
VI, Japan pledged to invest $20 billion through its private sector in African markets. Japan’s 
overall direct investment in Africa totalled $1.24 billion in 2015137. Over the past twenty-
three years, Japanese investments and trade have increased steadily showing signs of 
suitability.   
 
Human Resource Development 
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Japan champions human -centred development mainly through skills transfer and education 
of African people. Currently, the Abe initiative is a flagship scholarship initiative that has 
been fully funding and giving work opportunities to African youth in Japan.  In addition, the 
initiative plans to train 30 000 engineers by 2018 to support African infrastructure 
development138. Improvements in basic education through the successful implementation of 
the “Basic Education for Growth Initiative” and support for teacher training through 
UNESCO are some of the examples of Japan’s contributions139.   
 
Infrastructure Development  
 
Japan has a special relationship with the African Development Bank (AfDB) through the 
financing of infrastructure development on the African continent. Examples of successful 
finance big infrastructure development projects are the Bujagali hydropower in Uganda, the 
Sahanivotry hydropower in Madagascar, the Lekki toll road in Nigeria and the Takoradi II 
gas-fired plant in Ghana140. Egypt is benefiting from Japan through a $ 451 million loan to 
build a state of the art Grand Egypt Museum which will boost her tourism industry141. One 
factor that makes Japanese infrastructure development projects in Africa noticeable is their 
durability.  
As already argued, lack of infrastructure contributes massively to slow development of 
African states. Most African countries are landlocked compounded with poor aviation and 
road and rail infrastructure. The lack of mobility means that farmers cannot trade their 
produce and investors will be deterred to place resources in bottlenecks of these regions. The 
arbitrary borders of African states also make it impossible for the movement of people and 
goods. 
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 Japan launched the ‘One Stop Border Post’ (OSBP) initiative with the support of NEPAD 
and AfDP to tackle the problem of poor roads and ports in Africa. When the initiative is 
finished, problems with border procedures such as customs, immigration and vehicle will be 
eliminated.  In Southern Africa, the Chirundu One Stop Border Post between Zambia and 
Zimbabwe is a flagship success story142. The construction of a new bridge and electronic 
equipment and training of staff has eased up the busy border. The initiative will go a long 
way in making African transport corridors better and reduce the cost of transporting people 
and goods. 
 
Public Health  
 
As part of its commitment to the achievement of MDGs, Japan through TICAD initiated 
various public health projects with the help of the World Bank143. Africa benefits from the 
Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility which was recently launched by Japan and the 
World Bank Group. The fight against Malaria, TB, and prevention and treatment of HIV has 
been Japan’s main efforts.  At the TICAD VI, $ 24 billion was committed by Japan in 
collaboration with the World Bank and the Global Fund144.  
Japan has also been a leader in supporting women, particularly in reproductive health. Japan 
has a Japan Trust Fund for HIV and reproductive health that has allocated funds to 
programmes in Kenya, Lesotho, Rwanda, Ghana, Swaziland and Senegal145. Japan works 
closely with the World Health Organisation (WHO) in its public health initiatives.  
 
Food Security  
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As Africa’s population grows, the demand for food will also increase. By 2050, the African 
sub-Sahara population growth is expected to reach 2 billion146. Climate change has greatly 
affected food production with many states failing to produce enough food to feed their 
populations.  Japan has been supporting the Food and Agriculture Organisation through 
sending its skilled workers to help boost African farmer’s productivity. In addition, new 
methods of planting and growing rice have been taught to Africans from experts in Japan. In 
2013, Japan committed to supporting African rice production through $32 billion through the 
Coalition for Rice Development (Card) initiative147. Over the last 25 years, the proportion of 
African facing hunger decreased from 28 to 20 percent despite the growing population. 
Africa needs TICAD to place more support in ending hunger on the continent.  
 
Political and Cultural Exchanges  
 
Political relations between African states and Japan are not strong largely because of the 
historical relations between Japan and African states because of Japanese history of sidelining 
African quest for independence. Japan, for example, failed to support international pressure 
to end apartheid in South Africa. Bilateral visiting of heads of states between Japan and most 
African states are limited, however, Prime Minister Abe managed to visit Mozambique, 
Ethiopia and Cote d’Ivore in 2014, thus showing signs of improvement or rather the 
willingness of Japan to better political relations148.  
Cultural exchanges between Japan and African states are in the form of sports particularly the 
famous martial arts like Karate. In addition, Japanese embassies have the Japan Exchange 
and Training (JET) programme that promotes language learning and fosters understanding 
between Japanese communities and African communities. The cultural exchanges remain 
small and one would that there is room for improvement from both sides.   
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Towards a Sustainable TICAD  
 
TICAD’s brings about various institutions including the co-organiser World Bank, OSSA, 
UNDP and AUC to the table. The latter is one of TICAD’s positive characteristic. Not only 
are Japans efforts be channelled at TICAD but other countries and organisations are afforded 
the platform to engage Africans in development matters. As the TICAD fast approaches its 
25th anniversary in 2018, one can argue that the framework has achieved a lot. Its inception 
has resulted in other countries like Turkey, India, and South Korea who traditionally did not 
pay attention to African matters to start engaging Africans on development under similar 
conference diplomacy set ups.   
People to People Diplomacy between Africans and Japanese people remain weak and needs 
improvement. The decision to host the TICAD VI in Nairobi was an important step towards 
true ‘ownership’ and fair ‘partnership’ the characteristics of Tokyo’s engagement with 
African states.  Trade and investment alone will not result in long-lasting relationships 
between Japanese people and African people. Leaders from both sides need to set up and 
show engagement on the political and cultural side of the TICAD platform.  
Japan presence in African media and academia is limited. Although Japan engages in positive 
activities on the African continent, its activities barely receive media attention. Coverage of 
TICAD activities is low as compared to FOCAC. One would argue that this has resulted in 
few Japanese people and African people knowing exactly what Japan has been doing on the 
continent. The planning and coordinating of TICAD already show positive signs of 
transparency through the involvement of diverse institutions including the AUC and OSSA.   
As African states find their way into the global economy, Japan should be a destination of 
African exports. The relationship has evolved from Japan importing African raw materials to 
Japan importing value-added products. How are Africans going to meaningfully contribute to 
the global economy if they remain producers of raw materials? As the age of industrialisation 
reaches the digital age, Africans has a lot to learn from Japanese in areas of advanced 
technology.  These lessons can be used to meet some of the aspirations of the AU’s Agenda 
2063.  
 
Conclusion 
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TICAD has achieved a lot within its two decades of existence. There are a lot of areas to 
improve as well as success stories to celebrate. This chapter has managed to explain the 
structures of TICAD and how it functions.  It has identified the key actors within the structure 
and explained their functions. 
 A substantial portion of the chapter focused on the thematic areas (infrastructure 
development, public health, peace and security, food security, trade and investment and 
human resource development).  Japan was seen to have been strong in supporting peace and 
security initiatives as well as human development projects. Infrastructure development 
initiatives are not a grand as its counterpart China however, they are strategic like the ‘One 
Stop Border Post’.  
The area of political and cultural exchange is currently lacking given the vibrancy of TICAD. 
Japan and African government can do more in making sure people to people diplomacy are 
improved, and one way is to increase contact between Japanese and African people. 
Organisations such as JICA and Japanese embassies in African countries can do much more 
to bring Japanese food, culture and language to Africa people. In return, Africans should also 
get a platform to showcase the diverse African cultures to Japanese people. 
The general participation of African institutions at the TICAD is positive with the AUC and 
OSSA being co-organisers and leaders in follow-up mechanisms. This means that Africans 
can decide what kind of help they need from Japan. The level of transparency and 
commitment to African development by the TICAD initiative should be welcomed. As Africa 
chases its Agenda 2063 and SGDs the TICAD platform will be instrumental in the realisation 
of the benchmarked goals.  
Japan’s soft power has been used for co-optive means of persuading African states to support 
its interests particularly in international organisations and multilateral organisations such as 
the UN.  The hosting of TICAD on Africa soil was a positive move towards giving African 
people ownership of the developmental process that TICAD comes with. The challenge that 
Japan and African states face is reaching grassroots African people and make them aware of 
the fast-evolving relationship that exists between Japanese and African people. African and 
Japanese people should not be bystanders to opportunities that are presented by TICAD. 
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Chapter 5: TICAD vs. FOCAC: A Comparative Analysis  
 
Introduction  
 
Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and China’s 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are two special- conference diplomacy 
frameworks that have been on the forefront of Japanese and Chinese foreign policy and 
developmental efforts to African states. The focus of this chapter is to have a comparative 
analysis of TICAD and FOCAC. Synergies between TICAD and FOCAC can be used by 
Africans to draw maximum gains from the two frameworks. African development remains a 
necessity if African states want to contribute meaningfully to the global economy.  
It should be noted that Chinese and Japanese engagements with African are different from the 
traditional European approaches and to some extent have defied the old patterns of 
developmental assistance. Mensah notes that one of the unifying features of the recent forays 
of China and Japan into Africa is the willingness of both countries to reject the long-held 
narrative of Africa as a basket case - a region beset by conflict, poverty and tepid results from 
Western-led development cooperation in the post-independence period149. The latter is 
profound given the Pan-African zeal enshrined in the African development agenda.  
TICAD and FOCAC are central to understanding the nature of Japanese and Chinese 
contributions to uplifting Africa as both special conference diplomacy frameworks represent 
the epitome of Sino-Japanese developmental engagement with African states and the AU.  
The AU stands as the voice of Africa, the sole representative of the continent's leadership and 
is, therefore, the place to consult as far as African development is concerned. The chapter is 
compared how Japan and China contribute to the previously discussed thematic areas covered 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. These thematic areas have been identified as areas crucial to 
African development as enshrined in Agenda 2063 and to a certain extent in NEPAD and the 
new Sustainable Development Goals.  
 
                                                          
149 Chaldeans Mensah (2014) China and Japan in Africa:  Globalization and New Norms of Development                                         
Assistance and Cooperation, 23rd World Congress of Political Science Montreal, Quebec.  
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Are China and Japan competing?  
 
There is no doubt that Japan and China are competing on the African continent. According to 
Tiezze150, there are competing perspectives on the nature of this rivalry, with both disavowals 
of its existence and confirmation that it represents another phase of the mistrust and economic 
competition between two states.  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from the Japanese side has 
shown unprecedented interest in Africa with a new assertive foreign policy. China’s interests 
in Africa are nothing new and have historical references however its recent rise has also seen 
renewed engagements. China has shown signs of strong commitment to its economic, 
political, security and ideological interests while engaging African countries. The ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ and ‘One China’ policies, for example, is a good reference point. On the other 
hand, Japan has been credited with focusing on its economic interests mainly support of 
Japanese firms on the African continent.   
Japan’s overall direct investment with Africa totalled $1.24 billion in 2014 while China’s 
investment in a small African in land size and population, Equatorial Guinea in 2015 totalled 
$ 2 billion151. China’s total trade with Africa stands at $179 billion in comparison with 
Japan’s $ 24 billion152. China totally dwarfs Japan when it comes to trade and investment on 
the African continent. Numbers alone, however, do not paint the full picture. Africans do not 
need only huge investments; they require the ability to develop on their own and to gain skills 
something Japan has been championing.  This is not to say China does not invest in African 
skills development and human resources but issues like Chinese workers coming to African 
states to work on large scale Chinese projects are non-existent in Japanese projects.   
Chinese companies have the advantage of being state-backed and having less restrictive 
standards when abiding by international rules and regulation. Japanese companies, on the 
other hand, operate from a country that is very strict when it comes to meeting international 
rules and regulation. Consequently, Chinese MNCs get an upper hand in African markets. 
Chinese companies are using smart moves like merging with already established Western 
MNCs giving them not only the advantage of being a ‘latecomer’ in already opened 
                                                          
150 Tiezzi, Shannon (2014) Africa: China and Japan’s next battleground? The Diplomat 15(1): 1-5. Available at: 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/africa-china-and-japans-nextbattleground/ ( Accessed on 20 February 2017).  
151 Brookings, (2016) Rising Sino-Japanese Competition in Africa. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2016/08/31/rising-sino-japanese-competition-in-africa/. (accessed  13 February 2017).   
152 Ibid.  
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markets153. The latter is something that Japanese MNCs did not have. Prime Minister Abe’s 
increased investments in Japanese MNC’s market share in Africa as illustrated by the 
increased injection of resources into African private sector at the TICAD VI in Nairobi can 
be viewed as countering move to the dominant Chinese investments in Africa.  
Generally, Japan’s Africa policy is seen in the context of traditional North-South relations 
due to Japan’s membership of the OECD/DAC. Japan’s unquestioned solid aid record as the 
world’s top ODA donor by 1995, and its advancement of the G8 ‘Africa Agenda’ places 
Japan in the camp of traditional Western donors that have the disadvantage of being 
‘imposing’ given the history of SAPs on the African continent154. The latter works against 
Japan since Western aid although well received, is often scorned upon by African people.  
China, on the other hand, comes armed with the notion of shared history. It goes as follows: 
China has an unfortunate history of national disasters and colonialism inflicted by a common 
perpetrator Western states compounded by a brutal occupation by Japan; China was a poor as 
Africa a few decades ago; China supported African liberation movements; China assisted 
Africa with aid even when it was poor. This is in comparison with Japan seen as a coloniser 
itself that has a tainted history of not supporting Africa liberation and to some extent ignoring 
the call for the end of apartheid in South Africa. With these compelling arguments, China 
although often accused of building poor infrastructure, poor working conditions and 
negotiating unfair trade deals strong arms Japanese political interests on the continent. 
Political support for ‘One China’ policy is overwhelming on the African continent and China 
successfully reclaimed its position on the UNSC through the backing of Africa states support. 
The latter is contrary to Japanese poor support for UN reform and quest for a UNSC seat.  
 In addition, to the historical attachment that China uses to court African states, it has 
embarked on new strategies of winning support. China refrains from getting involved in 
African internal political affairs ‘non-interference’ policy. This has led to Beijing having 
warm relations with democratic and non-democratic states in Africa. Beijing is often 
criticised for supporting internationally pariah labelled states like Zimbabwe and Sudan. The 
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political and economic support defeats the Japanese principles enshrined in the Paris 
Declaration that suspends assistance to despot governments.  
 Japan has been supporting African financial architecture through investments in the African 
Developmental Bank (ADfB) where it holds shares. The bank has been instrumental is 
financing infrastructure development projects in Africa. In addition, Japan brings African 
issues to global multilateral institutions like the G8 and World Bank and Paris Donor Clubs 
where it holds significant influence. TICAD, for example, has the UNDP and World Bank as 
some of its co-organisers showing willingness to bring the African voice to the international 
arena. China, on the other hand, has been on the forefront of transforming the international 
financial architecture through the establishment of the BRICS development bank. Non -
traditional actors in developmental assistance like South Africa, India and Brazil are teaming 
up to change the rules of the game.  South-South cooperation, as opposed to North-South 
relations, is the compelling maxim the BRICs where China to some extent takes a leadership 
role. Japan has often emphasised South-South co-operation however its alliance with Western 
powers brings mixed signals to African states who are with China determined to see 
increased South- South cooperation in the spirit of Bandung.  
 
TICAD vs. FOCAC: What do China and Japan have to offer?  
 
Japan and China have both developed high-profile conference diplomacy (TICAD versus 
FOCAC) designed to woo African leaders with soft power, often with an emphasis on new 
forms of development assistance backed by long-term financial commitment. TICAD and 
FOCAC as frameworks for conference diplomacy have contributed to the generation of new 
development ideas and in addition, have injected fresh approaches to the traditional 
development rational. The drive to secure natural resources is central to both Japanese and 
Chinese interest on the continent. African development and strategic alliance seem to come 
secondary given interests are shown by both China and Japan to acquire African natural 
resources. The latter brings into question the interests of both countries in honestly 
developing Africa. Nonetheless, it is important to understand areas where China and Japan 
offer similar developmental approaches and where they differ. The similarities and 
differences between TICAD and FOCAC are also for African states to know how to engage 
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Japan and China in the conference diplomacy setups, particularly when negotiating issues 
that are relevant to African development like trade deals.    
Jian argues that critics charge China with pursuing a narrow mercantilist policy on the 
continent for pure economic benefits without human or environmental concerns155.  These 
sentiments are part and parcel of attacks by threatened parties who see the increased trade and 
diplomatic ties as a danger to the established status quo. The advent of CCTV in Nairobi and 
Johannesburg is welcomed in balancing the media propaganda that is anti-Chinese.  The 
FOCAC framework should, therefore, invest more in people to people diplomacy and give 
more attention to media. Africans on the grassroots do not know what the Chinese are doing 
for Africa. In 2012, anti- Chinese riots broke out after wage disputes in Zambia resulting in 
the death of a Chinese coal mine manager156. Sino –pessimists interpreted this incident as a 
sign of African not welcoming Chinese presence on the continent. Statistics show that while 
anti-Chinese sentiments are still widespread they are gradually decreasing due to increased 
contact and trade.  As argued earlier, people to people diplomacy is crucial in breaking the 
barriers created by stereotypes.  The FOCAC framework is currently investing heavily in 
people to people diplomacy through exposing Africans to Chinese culture through Confucius 
Institutes, cultural exchanges and youth festivals; this break cultural and language barriers 
that at times cause misunderstandings.   
Japan, on the other hand, has poor publicity about its works on the continent. The advent of 
FOCAC brought TICAD on the limelight. Japanese aid has been building schools, drilling 
wells and treating the sick in grassroots communities in Africa for a long time. This is 
opposed to Chinese aid that has brought in Chinese nationals as economic immigrants. The 
rise of ‘Chinatowns’ in African cities has often brought discontentment from African shop 
owners who compete with Chinese shop owners. Japan does not have its citizens in small 
businesses like the Chinese do. The cultural diplomacy and people to people diplomacy of 
Japan are limited to activities hosted by JICA and Japanese consulates and embassies often in 
martial arts and youth exchange programmes.  
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The Structural differences of TICAD and FOCAC 
 
Knowing the make-up of the institution, the parties involved and who runs the agenda is 
crucial in comprehending TICAD and FOCAC.  For starters, both Japan and China take 
leadership within the set up of the conferences with financial backing for organising and 
sponsoring of the projects. China’s FOCAC has fewer co-organisers with the AUC only 
getting admitted as a co-organiser recently. On the other hand, Japan’s, TICAD has multiple 
actors as co-organisers and has brought African support strongly since its inception. To a 
certain degree, China is secretive and lacks transparency when it comes to the operations of 
FOCAC. The FOCAC documents are difficult to obtain while TICAD has some level of 
transparency and openness.  
The participation of civil society is strong within TICAD. As indicated in previous chapters, 
often long lists of delegates from different sectors attending as well as contributing to TICAD 
deliberations. Civil society is prioritised and plays and important role in the work of TICAD. 
China is government to government oriented and gives little attention to civil society. The 
differences in how civil society is treated by TICAD and FOCAC is one stark difference 
between the institutions.  
China engages in government to government grant infrastructure development projects in 
most African countries. Due to Chinese investments, there have been extensive 
improvements in airports, fast railway, airports, power plants and roads in most African 
countries. Countries like Angola, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) have had their infrastructure revamped by Chinese assistance. Japan is also involved 
in these projects and tends to focus on clean energy projects particularly hydro dams. 
Japanese projects although not as a grand as Chinese have developed a reputation for being 
durable. The ‘One Stop Border Post’ for example has been helping African movement of 
people and goods do not cost Japan much, however, it's strategic in opening the bottlenecks 
of transport problems in various regions on the continent.  
Peace and Security are areas where both China and Japan perform well. China has however 
been accused of supporting rogue regimes. Often these regimes have poor records on 
democratic ideals and human rights an area Japan does not compromise when engaging 
African states. The issue of governance is a point of divergence for TICAD and FOCAC. 
While TICAD emphasises good governance ideas like fair elections and benchmarks for 
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governance with institutions like the APRM getting support from TICAD. FOCAC has 
supported the AU mostly with technical assistance like building and servicing of the AU 
headquarters in Addis Abba, Ethiopia. 
Both FOCAC and TICAD human resource development contribution contribute to thousands 
of Africans skills transfer and training. TICAD prides itself with the Abe Initiative that has 
sponsored scholarships and secured working experience for Africans in Japan prestigious 
industries. In addition, it has been producing engineers aimed at supporting African 
infrastructure development. China provides scholarships to all African states that have 
relations with Beijing. New developments show that more African students are opting to 
study in China on self-sponsorship as relations between China and Japan increase.  
Food security has been on the agenda of both TICAD and FOCAC since their inception. Both 
Japan and China have previously sent their farmers to work hand in hand with African 
farmers. Africa because of its vast landmass and sources of freshwater has potential to not 
only feed its people but also export to the global market as food demands increase. Food 
security is affected by peace and security because most African food shortages problems are 
not a result of natural causes but a result of the conflict. Climate change has contributed to the 
food shortages also, therefore, African states need to liaison with both Japan and China to 
find solutions to these issues.  
 
The main similarities of TICAD and FOCAC  
  
Both Japan and China offer traditional forms of developmental assistance in the forms of 
concessional loans, debt relief and technical assistance. What is interesting about both Japan 
and China is the increase in investment and trade that comes with developmental assistance. 
It is no secret that both states see massive potential in African markets.  
China, Japan and another non-traditional donor, Republic of Korea meet periodically under a 
diplomatic process called the Trilateral Policy Consultation on Foreign Policy to discuss 
potential ways of cooperating on their respective policies to Africa. From Asian powers, this 
remains a perfect opportunity to collaborate and work for hand in hand. In this way, TICAD 
and FOCAC can find common ground and avoid direct confrontation. Africans can also take 
the opportunity to voice out their needs and ways they can cooperate with both parties. It is 
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crucial to note that African are prioritising investment and trade over mere handouts that 
come in the form of donor assistance. Agenda 2063 stipulates that dependency must be 
rooted out resulting in a self-reliant Africa.  
 
FOCAC and TICAD support of the African Union  
 
The AUC is part of the co-organising team of both FOCAC and TICAD. Although in both 
cases their inception came at a later stage it is important to note that both frameworks have 
some African representatives. With the AU focusing more on trade over aid it is important to 
have AU to help African countries get investors. Regional issues that are well vested with AU 
can be sorted out at these conferences. In short, the AU work with Japan and China is an 
opportunity for Africans to consolidate themselves to speak one voice.   
Japan has been a key supporter of NEPAD.  During TICAD conferences, Japan leaders voice 
out their support for the agency. During TICAD IV, Japan declared financial support for the 
NEPAD-OECD African Investment Initiative. FOCAC also has been instrumental in 
endorsing NEPAD and sees priority areas of China-African relations as consistent with those 
of NEPAD, particularly in agriculture, infrastructure, construction and human resources. A 
good example is the NEPAD Agency signing a Memorandum of Understanding with China’s 
Ministry of Agriculture to address underlying constraints in Africa’s agriculture while 
strengthening cooperation in that sector.  
Issues of democracy, good governance, and human rights are complicated when the AU 
engages China at the FOCAC. China’s human rights record is questionable and remains 
committed to the policy of non-interference in African states domestic politics. AU principles 
are bound to clash with Beijing’s interests. China has however started showing commitment 
to stability in African states with the Sudan and South Sudan mediation as an example. Japan 
has no major conflict of interests with the AU, so it can only improve its relations with the 
Commission.  
 
Conclusion  
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The Japanese are pioneers and were far ahead in conference diplomacy as compared to China 
that started FOCAC in 2001. China followed Japan’s footsteps and launched FOCAC a 
similar framework to TICAD. China and Japan constant renewed efforts of linking their 
respective foreign policy with development assistance and trade and investment should be 
welcomed. The UN, EU, World Bank, the custodians of old donor practices can take their 
involvement in the TICAD process to find innovative ways of engaging Africans. 
Unlike TICAD, which brings in major development partners into the dialogue, FOCAC 
places centrality on China’s relationship with Africa, particularly its bilateral relations within 
the context of the multilateral forum. This move is not sustainable because government to 
government relations cannot solve all issues. NGOs and civil society have proven their ability 
to reach grassroots societies and should, therefore, be used in engaging ways in which 
Chinese people and African people can genuinely establish a true win-win relationship.  
Self-reliance, partnership, ownership, win-win and South-South cooperation should remain 
central pillars guiding African relations with both Japan and China. The TICAD and FOCAC 
present the African continent with an opportunity to influence change in how foreign powers 
relate to African states. Africans should no longer accept being empty basket cases but a 
continent full of potential.  
This chapter has managed to compare TICAD and FOCAC contributions to African 
development. Drawing from chapter three and four findings of what Japan and China focus 
on in their engagements with Africa, one can see that there is competition. They all are 
interested in similar areas. China due to its economic dominance is providing Africans with 
more assistance nearly in all fields. Japan, however, has strategic areas like peace and 
security where it performs better than China.  The AU as a central body that co-hosts the 
TICAD and FOCAC has the onus to show more seriousness particularly at the FOCAC where 
it is new as co-organiser. It needs to tell Japan and China what it wants, control the pace of 
the relations and most importantly keep African interests first.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
The research achieved the 5 main objectives: 1) argue that soft power is the driver of 
Japanese and Chinese engagement with Africa through TICAD and FOCAC conference 
diplomacy 2) Identify the African development agenda; 3) explain the TICAD and FOCAC 
frameworks and their contributions to African development; 4) Give a comparative analysis 
of TICAD and FOCAC engagements with Africa; 5) Gave recommendations to African states 
based on the observations.   
What I have learnt from the study is that the language of the donor is fast evolving. The AU 
and its organ institutions are refraining from using the term ‘donor’ and increasingly using 
the term ‘partner’. This change is informed by changes of placing business and trade ahead of 
donations by developed countries. The AU Agenda 2063 explicitly mentions ‘strategic 
partners’ as some of the pool of funders for the developmental plan. In my view, this is an 
important step towards moving away from handouts to a more self-reliant continent that is 
depended on its own resources.  
The AU needs to have policies of engagement with dealing with both China and Japan. As 
things stand a comprehensive policy does not exist. The lack of a plan of action means that 
African countries have no clear guidelines of engaging both China and Japan. At the FOCAC 
and TICAD level, an umbrella policy can be created that African states can use in their own 
bilateral relationships with both states. In that way, fair and consistent deals can be drawn up 
when China and Japan engage African states. The policy documents should be underpinned 
by Pan -African ideals and driven by African interest at the core.  ‘Beneficiation’ as the 
Japanese call value addition and ‘Win-Win’ should not be compromised.  No African natural 
resource should leave African shores without adding value to African lives through job 
creation and skills development. 
 
Soft Power  
 
Theoretical framework & hypothesis  
Theories are not static but fluid, therefore, the theories in International Relations can borrow 
from each other from time to time. They lose their relevance at times. Soft power as far as 
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explaining the emergence of conference diplomacy settings by Japan and China is a 
compelling argument. Nye’s soft power which falls under the realism school of thought 
seems to fit the conference diplomacy that Japan and China have established through FOCAC 
and TICAD. Acquiring influence drives both powers interests in foreign assistance on the 
African continent. The International Relations realm in inherently a contested space, 
therefore, Japan and China competition for influence on the continent is nothing new.  
Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power can be argued to be correct in Chinese and Japanese 
engagements with Africa through FOCAC and TICAD. As African states continue to pursue 
developmental policies that can uproot their ordinary people from poverty they need to take 
advantage of Chinese and Japanese interests in getting maximum support for their policies. In 
the end, however true meaningful development will not come from Beijing or Tokyo but 
rather from the consistent efforts of African people to create a better future for themselves.  
The hypothesis that holds that FOCAC and TICAD are competing frameworks aimed at 
complementing both Japanese and Chinese foreign policies in African states. In addition, 
Japan and China are competing for East Asian powers using different mechanisms in their 
foreign policies to gain soft power is correct. The competition is visible is different fields. 
Proving soft power is a difficult task however given the type of research conducted one can 
argue that the research has successfully proved that Japan and China are competing for soft 
power on the African continent.  
Japan-Africa relations are poorly researched within African academia. There is a need for 
more academics to give the subject attention. TICAD and FOCAC have been heightened by 
media coverage, however, there is a need for more holistic research in the following fields 
associated with TICAD and FOCAC: 1) How Japan and China engagements have influenced 
civil society in Africa; 2) There is need to look at follow up documents and see whether 
resources are channelled into the correct sectors; 3) Women and youth development through 
TICAD and FOCAC engagements should be researched ;4) TICAD and FOCAC Action 
plans at every conference need to studied and analysed;5) Through research academia should 
actively influence the AU to develop policies for engaging all external partners. 
 
Policy Recommendations: What the AU should be doing at FOCAC and TICAD  
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The following are suggestions on how the AU can play a more prominent role at the TICAD 
and FOCAC:  
 Africa needs policies for a regional and sub-regional level in dealing with Japan and 
China.  
 African broader development strategies like the Agenda 2063 and other NEPAD 
policies should be implemented with engagements at TICAD and FOCAC in mind  
 Xenophobic attacks on Chinese nationals in Zambia are a result of poor planning and 
uncontrolled migration of Chinese people. African government should educate their 
people about the relationship between Asian powers and Africa. In this case, Chinese 
Confucius Institutes can be used. Japan and African states should improve people to 
people and cultural diplomacy.  
 Grassroots constituencies should benefit from the growing relationship. The sentiment 
that foreigners are taking small business from Africans can be countered if the 
TICAD and FOCAC frameworks benefit more than just elites in African states.  
 A fair balance in the ‘partnership’ and ‘win-win’ relationship is needed. As things 
stand Africans are exporting natural resources in return for access to loans and 
infrastructure development.  ‘Win-win’ and ‘Partnership’ should in the form of fair 
trade, not diplomatic façade.  
 Globalisation is not a zero-sum game, Africa should seize the opportunity presented 
by Asian states to take a leadership role in globalisation given the rise of anti-
globalization forces in Europe.  
 There is power in numbers, therefore the African States should negotiate with a 
stronger arm through negotiating collectively.   
 Use Chinese and Japanese companies launch African enterprises at a global scale. 
Government to government deals of the Chinese can be used to strengthen state-
owned enterprises and support for infant industries. Japan is strong with private 
companies this should be used to support African private companies.  
 
The Way Forward for TICAD and FOCAC 
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China needs Africa’s raw materials to sustainment its modernisation and economic reforms 
and on the other hand, Africa needs Chinese investments mainly hard infrastructure 
investment to industrialise. The global commodity price index rose with the rapid demand for 
natural resources from the industrialising China. It is no secret that these prices are subjected 
to booms and bursts, therefore, African states should learn from history that diversification of 
their sources of income is important. 
 African states should understand that there are long lasting consequences if African states do 
not invest their gains from the surge prices of natural resources. Natural resources will 
deplete leaving African states state coffers empty. It is crucial for African states to diversify 
their economies as well as promote value chain addition to maximally benefit from their 
resources. The FOCAC and TICAD framework should, therefore, be an institution for 
sharing practices and learning from each other. 
Currently, global power structures are unbalanced in a way that has heavily disadvantaged 
African states.  The lack of a permanent UNSC member from Africa and other developing 
states of the global South shows why reforms in global multilateral institutions are necessary.    
The call for reforms of the Security Council is of uppermost importance to African states, 
therefore Beijing should support Africa’s appeal for fair representation.  China and Japan are 
also needed to bring the African voice at institutions like the G20 and World Trade 
Organisations. The lack of fair representation in important institutions like the UNSC, G20, 
and WTO is a crisis for African states. Japan’s quest to getting a seat on the UNSC should go 
hand in hand with African representation on the prestigious body.  
Africa’s long-term development should a priority. While short-term gains through increased 
trade have been witnessed, Africans should start looking at how the Sino-Africa and 
Japanese-Africa relations can have long lasting benefits. Beijing’s and Tokyo’s willingness to 
enter troubled countries traditionally shunned by the Western world is something that Africa 
should be built upon in repairing deindustrialised states like Zimbabwe and war-torn states 
like Somalia and South-Sudan. China’s investments in post-civil war Angola have produced 
remarkable results. Angola features in the top 10 developing countries in the world largely 
due to its increase in oil exports directed China.  
The textile industry in most African states has been destroying as most clothing is imported 
from China. Rising labour costs in China means that manufacturing in all sectors will move. 
Africa needs to be ready to take the opportunity to create jobs and industries for its 
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unemployed and poor-performing industries. There is an urgent need to diversify the trade 
relationship that African states have with China. The exportation of unfinished products like 
minerals is unsustainable. Africa should tap into sustainable industries like tourism as there is 
demand from China with much Chinese middle class starting to explore the world. The 
technological age upon us is an opportunity for Africans to learn from the Japanese.  
The FOCAC framework has matured over the last 16 years and with its coming to age, wide 
consultation, joint development and common development has become part and parcel of the 
institution. The Bandung spirit that shapes the South –South relations is visible in the 
FOCAC framework. The framework has achieved remarkable achievement within the 
shortest period and ought to be celebrated. There is room for improvement in most of the 
frameworks activities however its current activities welcomed. As the Johannesburg Action 
Plan is being implemented, there are no doubts that targets agreed will be met given that 
China has honoured its past pledges.  The enthusiasm in African states to engage China are a 
positive sign that Africans will not be bystanders to the growing evolving relationship that 
China has with Africa. In conclusion, I foresee a long-lasting relationship that is sustainable 
between African states and China given that mutual respect and win-win cooperation remain 
the backbone of the FOCAC framework.   
Japan has been hosting the TICAD framework for more than two decades now. Japan has had 
a successful developmental state approach which worked well. TICAD has brought about 
opportunities that have benefited Africa greatly. As the framework grows given the 
competition from China and other non-traditional donors, Africans should be ready to work 
with a renewed Japan policy in Africa. There are many lessons to be learnt from Japan as far 
as development is concerned.  
In conclusion, one can argue that truly sustainable development for African people will not 
come from Japan or China. It will be through the hard work and determination of African 
themselves. As Africans embark on achieving the Agenda 2063 vision, they should keep the 
Pan-African spirit alive. African solutions for African problems should remain a compelling 
maxim for African development quest.  
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